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SUMMARY 
A Government committee was formed to conduct an as-built review of the 
three Mod-2 wind turbine units at Goldendale, Washington. The purpose of the 
review was (1) to identify any critical components and subassemblies which may 
~ be deficient in either strength or predicted service life, the failure of which 
~ would cause safety hazards or significant downtime and expensive repairs; and 
~ (2) to recommend any corrective action necessary to enable continued safe 
att~nded and unattended machine operation. 
Detailed site inspections together with a review of all project document-
ation and some additional analysis were used to establish a list of 29 candi-
date critical components. From this list, seven components were selected as 
critical components needing more extensive study and analysis, and accordingly 
given major emphasis in this review. However, the concerns associated with 
all 29 components were addressed and closed out in this review process. 
This report documents the findings &nd recommendations of this review 
process. The recommendations are grouped in four categories to establish the 
specific time frame in which these recommendations should be implemented. The 
Mod-2 project office will make the final decisions regarding implementation, 
when considering any new information, available funding, schedules, and overall 
program redirection. 
The key conclusions of this study are as follows: 
(1) There were no deficiencies identified in this review process that 
would preclude planned near-term attended operation of the two available Mod-2 
units. However, some of the concerns require immediate corrective action and/ 
or careful inspection at frequent intervals during the attended operation. 
(2) Several of the critical components reViewed, such as the teeter system 
and rotor cap, have potentially serious deficiencies that require corrective 
action in order to increase the long-term operational life of the machines in 
the unattended mode of operation. 
INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND 
The Mod-2 wind turbine program was initiated in August 1977 when Boe1ng 
Engineering and Construction (BEC) was awarded the contract for development of 
a multimegawatt wind turbine system. This project was a continuation of the 
U.S. Department of Energy programs specifically structured to achieve a signi-
ficant advancement towards early commercial generation of cost competitive 
electrical energy from wind power. 
The design characteristics and features of the Mod-2 system are shown in 
figure 1. The first of the three units installed at the Bonneville Power 
Administration site near Goldendale, Washington, achieved first rotation in 
November 1980, with the other two following in March and May of 1981. Although 
subsequent operation has been faced with various operational problems as well 
as major component failures, the three machines have accumulated over 3700 hr 
of operation to date. This operation has led to the establishment of an exten-
s1ve engineering data base essential to the continued development of wind tur-
binle technology. 
In addition to the three units at Goldendale, Boeing has installed a Mod-2 
unit at Medicine Bow, Wyoming, for the Department of the Interior, and a fifth 
un1t at Solano County, California, for Pacific Gas and Electric. The opera-
t10nal history and hardware inspections of all five units were used as input to 
this as built review process. This report will refer to the Goldendale units 
as Wll, WT2, and W13; the Medicine Bow unit as W14; and the Solano unit as WTS. 
The failure of the low-speed shaft on Wll in November 1982 prompted the 
Government to initiate an as--built review of the Mod-2 units. The justifica-
tion for this review is the need to avoid additional machine failures resulting 
from undetected deficiencies in design and/or manufacture. These deficiencies 
could result in component failures that could cause safety hazards, or result 
in costly repairs and significant periods of machine downtime. It should be 
recognized that some deficiencies resulted from measured loads data not avail-
able at the time of initial design. 
The rotor on Wl1 has been removed rendering this machine inoperable until 
a new low-speed shaft is installed. However, there was a need to perform 
research testing on WT2 and WT3 during the interim period in the attended mode 
of operation, providing this could be accomplished safely. Thus, this review 
not only recommended corrective action for any deficiencies identified for the 
long-term unattended operation of the units, but also determined what correc-
tive action was needed for the short-term attended operation of WT2 and WT3. 
Th1s attended mode of operation extended from April into August of 1983. All 
three units were scheduled to be returned to full-time unattended operation by 
the end of the year. 
A memo establishing the Government Review Committee and its charter is 
found in appendix A. Several personnel changes in the committee have been made 
s'ince the date of the memo. The current committee includes seven NASA Lewis 
personnel people and one Bonneville Power Administration representative listed 
as the eight authors of thi~ report. 
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OBJEClIVE 
The objectives of the Mod-2 Government review were (1) to identify any 
critical components and subassemblies which may be deficient in either strength 
or predicted service life, the failure of which would cause safety hazards or 
significant downtime and expensive repairs, and (2) to recommend any corrective 
action necessary to enable continued safe attended and unattended machine 
operation. 
MILESTONES 
The objectives stated previously were realized with the successful comple-
tion of the following three milestones: 
(1) Establish a list of critical components or subassemblies which could 
be deficient in either strength or predicted service life 
(2) Establish which (if any) of the above deficiencies were critical to 
future attended and unattended operation 
(3) Recommend any corrective actions that must be taken before 
attended and unattended operation can be resumed 
APPROACH 
BOEING SUPPORT ACTIVITIES 
The Mod-2 Project Office issued a contract task order to Boeing Engineer--
ing and Construction, the Mod-2 contractor, on January 27, 1983, to provide 
the necessary support to the Mod-2 Government Review Committee. (See fig. 2.) 
This task order enabled the contractor to supply the necessary personnel, 
services, analysis, tests, materials, equipment, and facilities to accomplish 
the following items: 
(1) Conduct detailed site inspections of Mod-2 units at Goldendale and 
Medicine Bow (results of the WT5 inspection at Solano provided by 
Boeing were outside the scope of this task order) 
(2) Establish a list of components or subassemblies which could have 
critical deficiencies 
(3) Conduct whatever analysis or study ;s needed to establish which (if 
any) of the above deficiencies are critical to future attended or 
unattended modes of operation 
(4) Prepare and recommend any corrective actions that must be taken to 
permit future attended and unattended operation 
(5) Document all findings in a final as·built rev1ew report 
The Government Review Committee worked very closely with Boeing during 
this review. Government and Boeing personnel with similar specialities and 
arE!aS of responsibility were encouraged to communicate on a one-on-one basis. 
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SITE INSPlC1IONS 
Boeing personnel representing their operations group, project engineering, 
and quality control office participated in the engineering site inspections. 
The same inspection team was used at all three sites (Goldendale, Medicine Bow, 
and Solano) in an attempt to provide consistency in the inspection process and 
uniformity in the subsequent assessments. At the start the inspection team was 
limited to looking for the following items: 
(1) Nonconformance of components with drawings 
(2) Evidence of movement of bolted parts 
(3) Corrosion 
(4) Cracked paint 
Documentation such as drawings, nonconformance reports (NCR's), problem 
reports, appropriate failure mode and effects analyses (FMEA's), etc. were also 
reviewed. 
Several of the Government Review Committee members also inspected the 
Mod-2 units at Goldendale and Medicine Bow. In general their findings con-
curred with the Boeing assessment. The inspections for each of the components 
are discussed in the section FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS; some of the major 
findings are summarized in appendix B. 
CANDIDA1E CRITICAL COMPONENTS 
The initial requirement of this review was to establish a complete list 
of Mod-2 components and/or subassemblies that were candidates for selection as 
critical components. The following criteria were used: 
(1) Failure of this component would cause a safety hazard to personnel, 
result in a long machine downtime, and/or be very costly to repair. 
(2) Concern for this component must be supported by physical evidence of 
defects and/or nonconformance to drawings, or structural analysis predicting 
an inadequate margin of safety or dramatically decreased service life. As 
discussed later, however, this was not applicable to all of the electrical 
components. 
The initial list of candidate critical components established jointly by 
Boeing and the Government, after a review of the site inspection reports and 
other project documentation, included 16 structural and mechanical components 
and 12 electrical components. Two of the structural and mechanical items were 
combined into one item, one electrical item was separated into two items, and 
one item switched from electrical to mechanical (emergency hydraulic system). 
Although the concerns regarding potential spar buckling were discussed during 
the course of the review process, the rotor spar was not formally added to the 
list of candidate critical components being studied. For completeness in this 
report, however, rotor spars will be discussed resulting in the list of 29 com-
ponents shown in table I. For convenience in analysis and discussion, these 29 
items were further categorized into various subsystems as indicated in the 
table. The ordering does not reflect any priority used in the analysis and 
study of the components. 
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lhe low-speed shaft and nacelle control unit were excluded from considera--
tion by the Government Review Committee. The investigation of the low-speed 
shaft failure and the design and fabrication of a replacement shaft was con-
sid€!red by another committee. For the nacelle control unit Boeing has reviewed 
and analyzed this system in depth, and has implemented all corrective actions 
that appeared necessary. 
SELECTION OF CRITICAL COMPONENTS 
lhe Chief Engineer of the Wind Energy Project Office, with the consensus 
of the Government Review Committee and the Mod-2 Project Office, established a 
list of critical components. The rationale used to select these items from 
the list of candidate components was as follows: 
(1) Priority established jointly by the Government Review Committee and 
Boeing 
(2) Existing data base available for assessment and/or absence of 
previous reviews 
(3) Impact of potential failure of that particular component 
(4) Available resources 
The following seven components, as indicated in table I, were selected as 
critical components: 
Item NO.3 - Emergency hydraulic system 
Item NO.7 - Teeter system 
Item No. 8 - Rotor cap 
Item NO.9 - Nacelle structure and major bearing supports 
Item No. 11 - Yaw drive system 
Item No. 16 - Tower, base, and foundation 
Item No. 17 - Gin pole system 
All of the above seven critical components were structural and mechanical 
components having a significant impact on operations if failure occurred. The 
failure of anyone of the candidate electrical components would not cause 
significant direct downtime of the wind turbine. The seven critical components 
were selected as the ones needing more extensive study and analysis. Boeing 
was subsequently directed to concentrate their efforts on these items. How-
ever, the concerns associated with all 29 candidate components were addressed 
and closed out in this review process. 
REVIEW PROCESS 
Following completion of the site inspections and an assessment of these 
findings, the various candidate components were analyzed by using the updated 
loads shown in appendix C. Appropriate fatigue analysis described in 
appendix 0 was used to estimate component and subassembly lives. In some cases 
additional loads data, and/or further disassembly were needed to completely 
understand the problem or concern. 
The Government Review Committee made two trips to Seattle to review in-
depth with Boeing the work being accomplished in the review process. The first 
visit occurred near the start of the review process to identify the candidate 
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critical components, and the second occurred at the end to review the overall 
findings and recommendations. 
In the interim periods, information was exchanged by either one-on-one 
telephone calls, or by conference calls. In addition, Government representa-
tives attended the weekly status review meetings at Boeing. The prime purpose 
of frequent communications was to confirm that all items were adequately 
addressed, as well as to reach a consensus between the Government and Boeing 
on the conclusions of the study. 
DOE COMMIT1EE REVIEW 
In order to ensure the proper coordination between organizations involved 
with the Mod-2 wind turbine units, DOE established a Mod-2 wind turbine program 
review group. This advisory group monitored progress and provided overall 
coordination of management and policy issues regarding the Mod-2 repair and 
testing program. Thus, this group needed to be kept informed of the findings 
of the Government Review Committee during the conduct of this review. To 
accomplish this the Chief Engineer of the WEPO, with the support of the Govern-
ment review comm1ttee chairman and the Mod-2 Project Manager, made three 
presentations to the DOE. committee on the status of the review. The overall 
schedule of review activities, shown in figure 2, indicates when these three 
presentations were held. 
fINDING~JlliP RECOMMENDATIONS 
lhe findings and recommendations of the Government Review Committee for 
each of the ?9 components studied in this review (see table I) are presented in 
this section. The seven critical components are discussed in the first group 
of components, followed by a discussion of the remaining 10 noncritical struc-
tural and mechanical components comprising the second group. As stated in the 
previous section all of the seven critical components selected for in-depth 
study were structural and mechanical components. The 12 noncritical electrical 
components are discussed in the final group. 
lhe discussion for each component defines the function of the component, 
the definition of the problem and/or concern, appropriate findings or analysis, 
and the recommendations for future operation. For both the critical as well 
as the noncritical components, there were no deficiencies identified that would 
preclude planned attended operation of WT2 and WT3, provided some corrective 
act10n is implemented. Several of the critical components such as the teeter 
system and rotor cap have potentially serious deficiencies that will require 
corrective action in order to increase the operational life of the machines in 
the unattended mode of operation. 
The recommendations made for the various components are listed in four 
categories that define when these recommendations should be implemented. The 
categories are (1) prior to attended operation, (2) during attended operation, 
(3) prior to unattended operation, and (4) during unattended operation. 
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CRITICAL COMPONENTS 
The seven critical components include the emergency hydraulic system, 
teeter system, rotor cap. nacelle structure and major bearing supports, yaw 
drive system, tower-base foundation, and the gin pole system. 
Jtem No.3 - Emergency Hydraulic System. - The rotor-pitch hydraulic 
system is designed to control the pitchable blade tips during normal wind tur-
bine operation, and to pitch the blade tips to the feather position for system 
shutdown. The pitch hydraulic system consists of standard, off-the-shelf 
hydraulic components, with the exception of a specially designed hydraulic 
res€'rvoi r. 
Concern: Undetected internal leakage in the pitch hydraulic system could 
cause loss of emergency shutdown capability. This concern was established by 
tests conducted on WT5. 
Findings: System and accumulator check valves from WTl were examined and 
found to be of a design in which the poppet could cock and jam open, partic-
ularly after wear. Evidence of poor poppet contact on the seat was also found. 
Procedures to detect and isolate internal leakage were found to be inadequate. 
Recommended action: Recommended actions prior to unattended operation are 
as follows: 
(1) Replace system check valves with an acceptable type to reduce leakage 
potential 
(2) Revise Operations and Maintenance Manual to provide more detailed 
internal leakage check and isolation procedures 
It~rnNg. L .. I~~t~r .. ~~tem. The teeter system, shown 'n f1gure 3, pro· 
vides the rotor w'th a single degree of rotational freedom that is limited to 
!6.5° out of the plane of rotation. The primary structural elements, shown in 
detail in figures 4 to 6, include the following: 
(1) Two elastomeric radial bearings 
(2) Two elastomeric thrust bearings 
(3) Two teeter bearing (radial and thrust) housings 
(4) Teeter-stop support structure 
(5) Teeter brake 
The elastomeric radial bearings allow angular teeter motion of the rotor 
with respect to the low-speed shaft. These elastomeric radial and thrust bear-
ings transmit the rotor loads into the rotor cap. These loads flow through 
the rotor cap, and into the low-speed shaft. The thrust bearings are oriented 
so that they carry the maximum component of rotor weight when the rotor is 
horizontal. When the rotor is vertical, the weight of the rotor is carried by 
the radial bear~ngs. The rotor cap structure interfaces with the low-speed 
shaft at one end and supports the rotor cap trunnion at the other end. The 
rad'ial and thrust bearing housings, due to their planform shape, are commonly 
referred to as the "horsecollars." Each horsecollar is attached to the rotor 
spar with 12, 1.5-in-diameter grade 5 body fit bolts. A plastic shim material 
was used to fill small irregularities, and thus provide optimum flatness to the 
mat1ng surfaces. A large d1ameter steel cy11nder serves as the hous1ng for the 
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elastomeric radial bearing. This cylinder is welded circumferentially, both 
on the inside as well as on the outside, to the horsecollar, thereby securing 
the elastomeric bearing to the horsecollar. The horsecollar provides the means 
to limit the rotor-teeter angle. A portion of the horsecollar structure is 
des1gned to bear against a teeter-stop support structure. The teeter-stop 
~upport structure is mounted to the low-speed shaft. When the rotor-teeter 
angle is at its maximum travel (!6.5°) the horsecol1ar bears against the teeter 
stop (metal-to-metal contact), thereby limiting its motion. Finally the rotor 
cap is attached to each elastomeric radial and thrust bearing by 16, 1.0-in-
diameter grade 8 bolts. 
Concern: The results of the engineering site inspections led to the fol· 
low1ng concerns: 
(1) Possible movement at horsecollar-to-rotor spar interface might indi-
cdte higher loads than anticipated. 
(2) Teeter- stop loads might be higher than those used in the analysis. 
(3) Elastomeric surface cracks might impact structural integrity. 
Findings: A summary of the BEC findings, as a result of the site inspec" 
tions and analysis, are as follows: 
(1) Iron oxide stains, indicating fretting at the horsecollar-to-rotor 
spar interface, were observed at location 1, figure 5, on all five Mod-2's. 
(2) Evidence of plastic shim failure was observed at location 7, figure 5, 
on WT4 and WTS. 
(3) Poor fit up (gap) at horsecollar-to-rotor spar interface was observed 
at location 3, figur"e 5, on WTS. 
(4) Weld flaws were observed at location 4, figure 5, on WT4; and a 
possible weld crack at the same location on WT2. 
(5) Surface cracks were observed on the elastomeric radial bearing at 
location 5, figure 5, on WT4. 
(6) A gap was observed at location 6, (see fig. 5) on WT4 between the 
elastomeric thrust bearing and rotor spar for the lower thrust bearing with 
the rotor horizontal, indicating a significant reduction in preload. 
(7) The bolts, location 7, figure 5, used to attach the horsecollar to 
ttle rotor, were torque checked. The torque measurements were lower than the 
original torque values at assembly. 
(8) Evidence of high teeter-stop loads at location 8, figure 5, were 
observed on WT5 This was presumably a result of nonoperating rotor-teeter 
motion in winds above cut-out velocity. 
(9) Analysis showed that the preload on the teeter-stop fitting bolts, 
figure 6, was insufficient to prevent slippage of the fitting. 
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The Government Review Committee and BEC performed a visual inspection on 
W14 at Medicine Bow, in February 1983. The results of the inspection of the 
elastomeric teeter bearing, teeter stops, and horseco11ar are summarized below. 
(1) Cracking over the surface of the elastomer was found. 
(2) A weld separation, in excess of 0.03 in extending one-third of the 
circumference, was found in the weld attaching the steel retainer of the radial 
bearing to the horsecollar. 
(3) The steel teeter stop was torn and galled. The bolts used to fasten 
the teeter-stop to the teeter-stop support structure showed evidence of being 
loose. 
(4) The horsecollar showed signs of shifting with respect to the rotor 
blade spar. 
Inspection of this same hardware on the three Mod-2 machines at Goldendale 
was conducted in March 1983. The elastomeric bearing surfaces contained 
cracks, but these were less severe than those found on WT4. Cracks found in 
the painted surface over the weld joining the steel retainer of the radial 
bearing to the horsecollar on WT2 were an indication of possible cracks in the 
weld joint. The horsecollar showed signs of shifting on WT1. However, this 
discrepancy was not noted on WT2 and WT3. 
Inspection was carried out to check the preload in the elastomeric thrust 
bearings. The inspection results were analyzed and the estimate of preload was 
between 50 000 to 70 000 lb. The design preload range for the thrust bearings 
was between 166 000 to 270 000 lb. The lower design preload value was deter-
mined by using the lowest specified spring rate (1.11xl06 lb/in) for the thrust 
bearing and the minimum deflection of 0.15 in. The 270 000· lb value was 
obtained by using the highest spring rate (1.35xlOO lb/in) and maximum preload 
deflection of the bearing of 0.20 in. BEC did not conduct an analysis to 
assess the effects of loss of thrust bearing preload. 
A review of BEC drawings indicated a lack of information on the procedure 
for installing the teeter bearing as~embly in the rotor. For example, the 
procedure for obtaining the proper preload in the elastomeric thrust bearing 
is not adequately described. Also the location of the shim material used to 
control the thrust bearing preload is not called out. 
The mechanical shifting of the horsecollar and the damaged teeter stops 
are probably a result of the teetered rotor impacts that occur when the rotor 
. i~ stopped and subjected to winds above the cut··out velocity. Further struc-
lural and mechanical damage can be eliminated by damping the teeter motion of 
the rotor while the rotor is stopped. In addition to the teeter motion damper, 
rotor azimuthal positioning control may be an effective means of reducing 
teeter motion in high winds. During the attended operations made in high wind 
conditions, the effectiveness of rotor azimuthal positioning on teeter motion 
should be investigated. 
Recommended action: Recommended actions prior to attended operat'on are 
a., follows: 
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(1) Retorque bolts attach1ng teeter bear1ng to rotor blade 
(2) Increase torque on teeter-stop support-structure attachment bolts to 
80 percent of yield 
Recommended actions during attended operation are as follows: 
(1) [stablish procedure for and monitor mot10n between the following: 
(a) Rotor blade and horsecollar 
(b) Low-speed shaft and teeter stop 
(c) Trunnion and pilot ring 
(7) ~stablish procedure for and monitor elastomeric thrust bearing gap 
(3) DisJssemble Wll horsecollar structures from rotor and inspect 
(4) Provide strain measuring instrumentation 
(5) With the manufacturer, evaluate the seriousness of the surface 
cracks in the elastomeric bearings 
(6) Determine cause of weld separation between horsecollar and radial 
bearing retaining ring 
(1) Determine effect of parked rotor position on teeter motion 
Recommended actions prior to unattended operat"\on are as follows: 
(1) Design, fabricate, and install a teeter motion damper 
(2) Replace plastic shim between horsecollar and rotor with steel shim 
(3) Determ1ne cause of loss of preload in thrust bearing and take 
correcti~e action 
Jj;"~IJLNo ... "lL.=_Rot...9L""~. - The rotor cap structure is shown in figures 4 
and 1. The large cylindrical portion of the rotor cap has a flange at one end 
for mating with the low speed shaft flange. The rotor cap and low-speed shaft 
flanges are connected with bolts, as shown in figure 7. The smaller diameter 
flanged cylindrical portion of the rotor cap is called the trunnion. The trun-
nion is welded to the inside and outside walls of the larger cylinder along 
the intersection of the two cylinders. Reinforcing gussets are welded at two 
locations as shown in figure 7. The trunnion flanges are bolted to the elas-
tomeric teeter bearing. 
Concern: The loads used to design the rotor cap are significantly lower 
than the loads currently acting on the structure. 
Findings: A summary of the BEC findings are as follows: 
(1) Evidence of corrosion at the rotor cap trunnion and teeter bearing 
;nterface, was found on the W14 and W15. 
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(2) Evidence of motion at the thrust bearing and teeter bearing inter--
face was observed on WT5. 
(3) Cracked paint and evidence of corrosion on the gussets of WT2 was 
found. Also, poor weld quality at the ends of the gussets was noted on WT4. 
(4) An inspection of the rotor cap and low-speed shaft bolted flange 
joint showed the following: 
(a) Wrench marks in the flange fillet radius of the rotor cap on WTl 
(b) Machine marks in the flange bolt holes on WTl 
(c) Evidence of fretting corrosion at the flange joint interface on 
WT5 
A structural analysis of the rotor cap was performed by BEC as part of the 
inspection and audit review. In the case of high cyclic loading (fatigue) 
conditions the critical parts of the rotor cap were identified. An estimate 
of the fatigue performance for each part was made. The results are summarized 
in the following table: 
,-------------------------------,----------------------------------, 
Rotor cap part Fatigue performance (hr before repair) 
r-------------------------------r---------------------------------~ 
lrunnion and teeter bearing 
pilot ring 
lrunnion and teeter bearing bolts 
Welded gusset 
Intersection weld trunnion 
4700 
19 after failure 
of pilot ring 
400 
3300 
A critical structural area is the trunnion-to-elastomeric bearing inter-
face. If the pilot ring fails to carry the interface loads, the bolts at the 
trunnion to~elastomeric bearing interface will carry the load for an estimated 
19 hr. The potential advantage of increasing the diameter of these bolts was 
not analyzed. Further analysis 1s needed to determine if larger bolts are 
desirable and practical. Methods for strengthening the pilot ring should be 
considered. Installation of a close tolerance backup ring is one possible 
method for increasing the fatigue performance of the pilot ring. Another 
approach is to investigate inserting steel dowel pins between the bolts. 
lhe BEC analysis of the rotor cap shows negative margins of safety for 
11mit loads applied to certain portions of the rotor cap. This particular 
load condition accounted for teeter "banging" that occurred when the rotor was 
stopped and subjected to high winds. All negative margins can be eliminated by 
the installation of an effective rotor-teeter damper. The teeter damper should 
substant1ally reduce the high impact type loads currently being absorbed by the 
rotor cap. 
lhe Government inspection found 8, 0.5-in-diameter holes drilled through 
the cylindrical wall of the rotor cap at station 1 and station 19 ~s shown in 
the BEC drawing 032-418000. The purpose of these holes is for inserting bolts 
used to se~ure hydraulic line brackets. structural analysis of the rotor cap 
to take into account the effects of these holes on the structural integrity of 
the rotor cap was not done. 
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Recommended action: Recommended actions prior to attended operation are 
as follows: 
(1) Grind gusset weld details to improve weld to a class "C" 
(2) Increase bolt torques of rotor c~p and low-speed shaft bolted flange 
joi nt 
(3) Increase bolt torques at trunnion and teeter bearing assembly joint 
Recommended actions during attended operation are as follows: 
(1) Monitor movement indicators (e.g., dental paste) at rotor cap-to-low-
speed shaft and at trunnion-to-teeter interfaces 
(2) Conduct further analysis and/or experimental evaluation of the 
following: 
(a) Rotor cap and low-speed shaft bolted flange to determine cyclic 
stress range 
(b) Trunnion and rotor cap intersection weld to determine stress 
variation around circumference 
(c) Rotor cap cylinder wall stress in presence of drilled holes 
(3) Instrument the following for strain determinations: 
(a) Critical gusset weld 
(b) Critical circumferential location at the trunnion and rotor cap 
intersection weld 
(c) Rotor cap near rotor cap and low-speed shaft bolt flange 
Recommended actions prior to unattended operation are as follows: 
(1) Increase bolt size and preload at low-speed shaft-to-rotor cap 
interface 
(2) Install additional gusset plates, as required, at trunnion and rotor 
cap intersection weld 
(3) Repair or redesign pilot interface 
(4) Grind fillet weld wrench marks and increase washer thickness to 
provide adequate clearance 
It~!l:) .. _fi()_. __ .?L __ Nafel te_structure and Major Bea~Supports. - The primary 
function~ of the nacelle are as follows: 
(1) Provide a rigid mounting platform for the major subsystems such as 
drive troin, generator, yaw bearing and drive, and associated support 
equipment 
(2) Serve as the structural path for loads that must be transmitted from 
the rotor to the tower 
(3) Provide environmental protection for components 
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The nacelle structure ;s of welded steel truss construction. The down-
wind low-speed shaft bearing supports are bolted to the nacelle structure, and 
the upwind low-·speed shaft bearing support is welded to the nacelle structure. 
Concern: The differences between the original design loads and the Mod-2 
aCcE~ptance test data could impact the structural integrity of several areas in 
the nacelle, including the major bearing supports. 
Findings: Inspection of the downwind bearing supports, shown in figure 8, 
indicated the following: 
(1) Two out of the eight bolts were undertorqued by 20 percent on WT3. 
(2) Undesirable gaps existed at bolt clamp up interfaces on all units. 
(3) Cracked paint was present at the edges of shims indicating possible 
working on all units. 
(4) In W15 there was an apparent 0.060-in upwind shift of the downwind 
bearing support. 
A visual inspection of critical weld areas in the nacelle did not identify 
any failures. The fatigue analysis estimated "time to repair" values varying 
from 6 mo to 10 yr as shown in figure 8. The analysis was based on the assump-
tions listed in appendix D. 
Recommended action: Recommended actions prior to attended operation are 
as follows: 
(1) Reshim the downw~nd bearing bolted joints to obtain proper clampup at 
the interface, and install new bolts, washers, and nuts 
(2) Grind welds on the secondary verticals of the primary truss structure 
Recommended action during attended operation is as follows: 
(1) Install instrumentation to obtain stresses at critical locations in 
the downwind bearing support and primary nacelle truss structure 
rtemli9._~._Jl __ - Yaw JlrJve .Syst~m ... The original Mod-2 yaw drive system, as 
shown in figure 9, cons'sted of a hydraulic power supply and drive motor, speed 
reducing gearbox, pinion gear, ring gear, six yaw parking brakes, and a drag 
brake to provide damping during yaw motion. The drag brake was removed in 
March of 1982 because it was ineffective in providing yaw damping. 
Concern: The structural integrity of the yaw drive system was a concern 
because of a history of problems, as well as recent data showing the system 
was being subjected to high impulsive loading. 
~indings: By using BEC nonconformance reports the following history was 
developed: Evidence that the yaw drive was being overloaded began to be 
observed in June of 1981 on WT2 after 122 hr of operation. Tapered dowel pins 
in the yaw drive retaining plate were found to be loose. Further examination 
revealed that most of the retainer bolts were loose. Additional dowel pins 
were inserted and the bolts retorqued. In March of 1982 these same bolts were 
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aga1n found to be loose in W12 and W13 after a total of about 250 hr of opera-
tion on each machine. The bolts were replaced with longer bolts so that lock 
nuts could be installed. At about this same time, after a history of numerous 
problems, the yaw drag brake was disconnected because tower torque measurements 
showed that it was ineffective in damping yaw motions. On August 24, 1982, 
after about 120 hr of operation, a crack was found in the yaw drive gearbox 
case of WT5 and the gearbox was replaced. 
Of all the components examined during the Government inspection of the 
Goldendale site, the yaw drive system showed the most obvious signs of damage 
and improper installation. Examination of the ring gear showed yielding and 
wear of the teeth over a sector of about 25°. Because of the predominant 
directionality of the winds at this site, the pinion works the ring gear over 
a relatively small sector most of the time. Alignment between the pinion and 
ring gear was such that contact between these two gears was maintained along 
only about one-third of the tooth width. The manufacturer of these gears 
recommends a minimum of 85 percent tooth surface contact. BEC measured back-
lash values between pinion and ring gear as large as 0.110 in. The manufac-
turer recommends backlash of 0.023-in minimum to 0.044-in maximum. 
The pinion gear specification calls for heat treatment to BHN 350/425. 
The ring gear specification calls for heat treatment to BHN 250/300. With the 
pinion gear having the harder surface, alignment and tooth surface contact 
become very important. Without proper alignment and tooth contact, excessive 
wear and possible tooth breakage can occur. Slivers of metal, as shown in 
figure 10, were removed from one ring gear. 
During Mod-2 operation, just prior to the low-speed shaft failure, 
measurements of hydraulic pressure at the yaw drive motor ports were made. 
These measurements, shown in figure 11, showed pressure impulses of close to 
2000 psi (system design pressure) when yawing took place while the rotor was 
at normal operating speed (17.5 rpm). If yawing took place when the rotor was 
coming up to operating speed, higher peak impulse pressures were observed. 
lheimpulsive nature of the pressure measurements is a result of the cyclic 
yawing moments produced by the rotor and backlash in the gear teeth. Because 
of the backlash, the nacelle can rotate through a small angle unrestrained 
except for friction in the yaw bearing. This motion continues until the ring 
~ear impacts the pinion gear causing a pressure spike in the drive motor. 
These pressure measurements provide evidence that the yaw drive syst~m 
was being subjected to loading that was not considered in its design. Design 
torques for the yaw drive gearbox were 11 600 ft-lb steady and 37 500 ft-lb 
limit. There was no specification for cyclic loading. Estimated actual load-
ing was based on yaw drive motor pressure measurements. Measured steady or 
mean torque was about 5000 ft-lb and measured cyclic peak torque was about 
32 500 ft- lb. The frequency of the cyclic torque was about one per rev, 
instead of the anticipated two per rev, indicating blade-to-blade imbalance. 
lhe effect of this loading on yaw gearbox life has not been assessed. 
The consequences of a failure in the yaw drive system were considered. 
lhe most serious failure was one that would leave the nacelle totally 
unrestrained in yaw. The nacelle and rotor would yaw out of the wind in an 
uncontrolled manner. Large yaw errors could result in severe teeter-stop 
impact loads that may damage the rotor and drive shaft. Because shutdown for 
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yaw error's based on a two-minute average, a cond,tion of large yaw error 
(greater than 20 0 ) could exist for that length of time. 
A number of steps could be taken to reduce yaw drive system cyclic load-
ing. The most severe loading could be alleviated by preventing yaw corrections 
when the machine's starting up or shutting down. This could be done manually 
during attended operation and with software changes during unattended 
operation. 
During attended operation, additional methods for reducing yaw drive 
system impulsive loading should be investigated. These methods should include 
the following: 
(1) Placing a crossover relief valve in the hydraulic system to limit the 
pressure buildup in the system 
(2) Dragging one or more of the yaw parking brakes during yaw corrections 
to introduce additional damping into the yaw drive system 
lhe latter method has been found to be very effective in protecting the 
yaw drive system in the Mod 0 and Mod-OA wind turbines from high cyclic load-
ing. Additional yaw position instrumentation and yaw control logic should be 
introduced to reduce the length of time the wind turbine can operate with large 
yaw errors. 
Recommended action: Recommended actions prior to attended operation are 
as follows: 
(1) Assess the effect of impulsive loading on yaw gearbox life 
(2) Clean and relube pinion and ring gear teeth 
Recommended action during attended operation is as follows: 
(1) Prevent yaw corrections from taking place during wind turbine startups 
and shutdowns 
Recommended actions prior to unattended operation are as follows: 
(I) Rotate the ring gear 90 0 
(2) Align pinion gear to ring gear so as to bring tooth contact and 
. backlash within the specifications of the manufacturer 
(3) Install crossover relief valves 
(4) Make software changes to prevent yaw corrections during startups and 
shutdowns, and to limit the duration of large yaw errors 
(5) Experimentally determine the effect of dragging one or more of the 
yaw parking brakes during yaw corrections 
Jtem tio_~d~-=_Towe~. Base, and Foundation. - The tower is a 193-ft-·tall 
cylindrical shell structure, comprised of welded ASTM A512 steel plate. The 
tower is 10 ft in diameter with a base section flaring to 21 ft in diameter at 
the ground. It is bolted to a foundation of reinforced concrete. At the 
Goldendale site 12 rock anchors, 28 ft long, attach the foundation to the 
bedrock. 
Concern: Boeing reported that the WT5 tower had experienced fatigue crack 
growth from a large slag Inclusion located at the SOD-in station shop weld. 
Undetected cracks in the tower could eventually contribute to a catastrophic 
failure. 
Findings: It is important to note that the Solano flaw, shown in 
figure 12, was first detected by an observation of rust stains on the exterior 
surface of the weld. Furthermore, this observation made by a BEC individual 
involved in another site assignment, 'proves that a 1 .75-1n crack can be detec-
ted by a visual inspection. 
The following three approaches to detection of tower cracks were con-
sIdered: 
(1) Audit all radiographs now in existence and/or reradiograph 
(2) Remove all reinforcement from the inside welds and penetrant inspect 
. (3) Visually inspect tower every 600 hr 
The first approach of auditing radiographs was not considered feasible 
because only 10 percent of the welds were required to be radiographed on WTl 
through W14 as the inspection requirement. Reradiography would be expensive 
as well as present a safety problem. 
The secoild approach was technically attractive because it provided reduced 
stress risers by smoothing the weld surfaces. In addition, this would make 
future inspections easier. However, the degree of weld surface preparation 
needed for subsequent penetrant inspections tend to make this approach less 
desirable. 
The WT5 experience proved that simply inspecting the towers visually is 
an effective method of detecting crack lengths even under 2 in. Fracture 
mechanics predicts that the critical crack size for this particular location ;s 
24 in for a 120-mph wind. The predicted tower crack growth rate is shown in 
figure 13. Thus, planned inspections at 600 hr intervals would give ample 
time to identify a crack before it became critical. Visual inspections of the 
inside of the towers for units WTl through WT4 did not reveal any cracks in 
the welds. However, there was some mismatch detected that was in excess of 
drawing tolerance. 
Additional inspections by Boeing as well as Government personnel resulted 
in the following observations: 
(1) Inspection of base-to-tower studs on WTl through W14 showed disturbed 
pa i nt on WTl and WT2. 
(2) Visual inspection of the tower grout revealed some hairline cracks, 
but no gaps or other indications of failure. 
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(3) A preload check of selected bolts on Wll indicated that the initial 
preload of 85 000 ~. 5000 ft-lb had dropped 15 to 20 percent on one-third of the 
bolts checked. 
The integrity of the 72 rock anchors that attach the foundation to bedrock 
was not checked in this review due to manpower limitations when considering 
higher priority items. 
Recommended action: Recommended actions prior to unattended operation 
are as follows: 
(1) Visually inspect tower welds every 600 hr for cracks 
(2) Retension all studs to 85 000 ± SOOO ft-lb 
(3) Seal tower grout to prevent entry of water and possible corrosion 
(4) Repaint base details 
(5) Check preload on rock anchors 
Jtem No. 17 - Gin Pole System. - The g'n pole system, shown in figure 14, 
is used to hoist and bring down heavy components of the wind turbine. The 
system consists of a 2S0-ft boom (gin pole), two backstays, a boom rest tower, 
winch, and associated anchors, pulleys, and cables. The maximum safe lifting 
capability of the system is 200 000 lb. 
Concern: The gin pole system was included as a part of this review 
because a structural problem with the system could possibly cause a cata-
strophic failure and/or excessive wind turbine downtime. 
Findings: The gin pole system has performed satisfactorily to date except 
for a failure of a backstay anchor plate on WT1. Fortunately, the failure did 
not occur during a lift but while the cables were being straightened with the 
boom on the boom rest. The anchor plate failed because it was subjected to 
offset loading not considered in its design. All anchors were subsequently 
modified to handle offset loading. 
lhe design specifications of the entire gin pole assembly, including the 
operational procedures to be followed during use, were reviewed in depth with 
Boeing personnel. The main element or gin pole is a 2S0-ft- long boom procured 
as a standard catalogue component used on cranes. The analysis used by the 
supplier established the load capacity of the boom at 700 000 lb. This trans-
lates to considerable load margins when considering rotor and nacelle lift 
weights approaching 200 000 and 175 000 lb, respectively. 
As stated above the backstay anchors were redesigned following the failure 
and now have the capability to accommodate all loads within the established 
load envelope, ~ncluding boom overloads. The base plate was analyzed and rein-
forced to yield a design margin of 1.41 for a rotor lift. The design margins 
on the cables and pulleys were greater than 3.S. Many of the catalogue items 
such as the shackles were procured having significant load margins. 
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No additional analysis was deemed necessary for some items such as wind 
stay anchors, support tower, winch, and anchor foundations. These items were 
designed initially with extremely high load margins, and, thus, did not warrant 
further examination. 
A visual field inspection of the gin pole system indicated some evidence 
of rust on cabling, blocks, and moving parts. Obviously, the integrity of the 
system is a function of the degree of rusting present. If left unchecked there 
certainly would be further degradation that could make the system unusable when 
required. The safety considerations involving a catastrophic failure of the 
system during use are somewhat minimized by the proof load testing imposed 
prior to use. 
Due to an increase in the weight of the new low-speed shaft design of 
10 250 lb, additional weight must be added to the proof load test assembly to 
meet the requirements of ANSI B 30.7-1977, para 7-2.2.2. 
Recommended action: Recommended actions prior to unattended operation 
are as follows: 
(1) Add additional weight to the existing gin pole proof load to compen-
sate for the increase in weight from modifications including new low-
speed shaft assembly 
(2) Incorporate formal gin pole Operations and Maintenance procedures 
which include assembly, disassembly, operation, proof test loads, main-
tenance, inspection, and corrosion prevention in the Operations and 
Maintenance manual 
(3) Provide environmental protection of the gin pole winch assembly 
NONCRITICAL STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL COMPONENTS 
As shown previously in table I, the 10 noncritical structural and mechan-
ical components are conveniently grouped into three separate subsystems as 
follows: Rotor assembly, nacelle, and drive train. 
Rotor Assembly 
The Mod-2 W1S has a steel, two-bladed, teetering, tip control type rotor 
with continuous carry through structure at the hub. As shown in figure 15, the 
rotor is divided into three primary sections as follows: the tip, the mid-
section, and the hub. A hydraulic actuator pitches the tip (outer 30 percent 
of the blade length) from approximately _50 to 90 0 with respect to the remain-
der of the blade to control rotor speed and power, and to provide aerodynamic 
damping of the power train. 
'"he basic construction of the rotor blade is a welded steel shell with 
steel spar members. The blade has a field assembly bolted flange splice at 
blade radial station 360 which attaches the blade midsection to the hUb. 
The five noncritical rotor assembly items discussed in this section 
include the rotor pitch actuator, rotor spindle, rotor welds, rotor spars, and 
rotor blade equipment mounting holes. 
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Item No. 1 - Rotor Pitch Actuator. - Each blade tip is controlled by a 
hydraulic actuator attached to the tip by a rod-end spherical bearing as shown 
in figure 16. The other end of the actuator is attached to the rotor spindle 
bearing assembly. The outer bearing assembly is rigidly secured to the blade 
midsection by six. grade 8 bolts. After the bolts are properly torqued, the 
bolt heads are safety wired. 
Concern: The overall concern questioned the strength of the actuator 
rod-end bearing assembly, and the resultant blade tip motion if this assembly 
should fail. 
Findings: A review of the loads on this rod-end coupling showed a high 
margin of safety. The failure modes and effect analysis confirms that the wind 
turbine system will shut down if the actuator fails. A one blade shutdown was 
demonstrated as part of the original acceptance testing. Furthermore, a free 
rotor-tip flutter analysis indicates no teeter-pitch coupling that would cause 
the rotor to impact the teeter stops. 
Recommended Action: No action required. 
Jtem No. 2 ~ Rotor Spindle. - The attachment of the tip spindle assembly 
to the blade midsection, as shown 1n figure 16, is made by six bolts for ease 
of assembly and removal. The spindle protrudes into the blade midsection in a 
way which provides a load path for centrifugal and bending moments. Tapered 
rin9s at the outboard rib and a close tolerance machined bushing at the inboard 
rib assure a tight fit between the spindle sleeve and the midsection of the 
rotor. The bearings are lubricated with a long-life grease through a Zerk 
fitting. A vent plug is removed during greasing to assure that adequate 
greasing has occurred. 
Concern: The three concerns that could impact the safe continued opera-
tion of the machines are as follows: 
(1) Loss of rotor-spindle bearing grease and/or bearing preload could 
lead to premature bearing failure 
(2) Loss of torque in bolts and/or the use of lower strength bolts than 
specified in the attachment of the spindle assembly flange to the blade 
midsection could cause loss of blade tip 
(3) Use of plastic shim material between highly loaded mating steel 
surfaces 
Findings: The bearing preload was maintained by six Belleville spring 
washers 1rlstalled on the rotor spindle in two stacked sets of three washers 
for each blade. These washers were installed as specified on Boeing drawing 
032-411311 and bench calibrated for exact stack height versus 168 OOO-lb design 
preload. Each match stacked set was cycled through a minimum of four, 0 to 
168 OOO-lb loads, versus measured heights. Data reviewed showed excellent 
consistency or uniformity of spring rates (nominally 400 000 lb/in) with a 
max'imum deviation of 0.001 in between the four heights measured during the 
calibration bench tests. The stacked height measurement is then permanently 
stamped to the rotor-spindle flange for the respective Belleville washer set 
installed. Each set is lubricated with grease during final installation to 
prevent corrosion. 
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Evidence of leaking grease was found during the inspection of blade No. 1 
on WTl at the rotor-spindle attachment interface flange. Closer inspection 
revealed that the grease seal was puckered out of its housing groove. Upon 
disassembly of the rotor-spindle assembly from the blade midsection, the large 
bearing was found to be damaged. Inspection of the grease seal revealed 
evidence of poor installation with two lumps of hardened white paint embedded 
in the face of the seal. The paint lump size, about 0.125-in square, caused 
the seal to pucker out of the bearing housing. Loss of grease due to high 
centrifugal force created a dry bearing, resulting in bearing failure. The 
bearing outer race that is shrunk-fit into the blade midsection housing had 
bearing roller impression depths of approximately 0.01 to 0.02 in. This 
occurred over approximately 90 0 of the circumferential surface of the bearing 
race. A reddish dry grease residue was very evident. Inspection revealed that 
the smaller inboard bearing was also damaged. Measurements of the bearing 
Belleville spring washers revealed a change in stack height of 0.10 in, which 
corresponds to a loss of 40 000 lb of bearing preload. Grease seal installa-
tion procedures, as described on Boeing drawing 032-421000, note 10, must be 
followed to prevent loss of grease. 
Prior to disassembly of the rotor spindle, flange bolt torques were 
measured at station 1249. The specified torque was down by as much as 
30 percent in two bolts. In addition, two other bolts were unmarked grade 2 
bolts, and thus were of much lower strength than the grade 8 bolts required by 
the specification. 
An inspection of the flange face of the blade midsection to which the 
rotor spindle assembly mates revealed that several of the tapped holes had been 
modified with threaded inserts. These were used because the original threads 
were stripped during handling operations prior to shipment to the site. This 
handling was accomplished by using too few bolts for the load, and thus the 
threads were stripped. If all bolts had been used in maneuvering the blade, no 
problem would have occurred. In any event, the use of inserts does not degrade 
the structural integrity or load capacity of an individual hole. However, as a 
precautionary measure, a recommendation for inspection of these inserts has 
been made. 
Plastic shim material was used to assure 
the rotor-spindle flange-to-blade interface. 
modulus considerably less than that of steel. 
required for this application, its compressive 
Thus, plastic materials should only be used as 
load bearing material. 
that flat surfaces exist between 
This material has a strength and 
Under the high bolt preload 
strength may be inadequate. 
a weather seal and not as a 
Recommended action: Recommended action prior to attended operation is as 
follows: 
(1) Measure the Belleville spring lengths for conformance to specification 
initially and every 2 mo thereafter 
Recommended actions prior to unattended operation are as follows: 
('J) Inspect the flange attachment bolts for conformance to specifications 
on type and torque 
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(2) Replace the plastic shim material between highly preloaded flange. 
faces with steel material 
(3) Inspect the flange to determine if inserts provide a satisfactory 
long-term repair 
Item No. 4 - Rotor Welds. - Any undetected crack in the welded steel rotor 
blade that reached critical flaw length (e.g., 28 in at station 360) could 
cause a catastrophic failure. The only means of crack detection being used 
since the original acceptance of the welded structure is the crack detection 
system described in appendix E. 
Concern: The rotor welds in the chordwise direction are of primary con-
cern because of the following observations: 
(1) Higher than expected flatwise cyclic loading 
(2) Fracture mechanics data used by BEC do not fully agree with data 
found in published literature (ref. 3) 
Findings: The interiors of the blades on units WTl through WT4 were vis--
ually inspected, with no evidence of any weld cracking noted. However, the 
following observations were made: 
(1) Incomplete weld repair noted in some areas 
(2) Evidence of poor use of backing bars on leading and trailing edges of 
the center rotor section (see appendix B) 
Although tested by a simulated crack, the detection of an actual crack in 
the rotor blade has never been demonstrated. An unintentional leak at the 
blade interior access ports did trip the system, providing verification that 
the leak detection system does operate as intended. Thus, the recommendations 
madf~ in appendix E are directed at assuring or increasing the reliability of 
this system, rather than correcting any deficiencies. 
Other means of identifying cracks that develop during field operation, 
before they reach a critical length, have been discussed. They include dye 
penetrant, radiography. ultrasonics, and acoustic emissions. None of these 
are fully acceptable, practical approaches when considering safety. cost, 
acc1essibility, and the qualifications or training required of the personnel 
conducting the test. The reliability of these alternate crack detection tech-
niques is highly influenced by the personnel involved in conducting the test. 
The visual inspection of the rotor blades, while the rotor is in the air, 
must, from practical considerations, be limited to the interior of the blades. 
Because of the number of welds, the time required to inspect, and the human 
error associated with a tedious process, it also seems practical to limit the 
inspections to the most critical welds. Thus, the process of identifying those 
welds for visual periodic inspection is extremely important. The criticality 
of the welds should be established by an analysis that includes the following: 
(1) Cyclic load level severity 
(2) Weld sink-in and mismatch 
(3) Quality of the weld based on radiographs 
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(4) Potent1al for stress red1str1but10n due to skin buckling 
(5) Other factors that may increase the potential for an existing flaw to 
grow 
To aid inspect10ns these critical welds should be appropriately identified 
on the inside of the blade. 
Recommended action: Recommended action prior to attended operation is as 
follows: 
(1) Requalify the crack detection system (as discussed in appendix E) to 
assure its reliability 
Recommended action prior to unattended operation 1s as follows: 
(1) Identify critical welds in accordance with the guidelines established 
above, clearly mark cr1t1cal welds on the inside of the blade, and 
perform visual inspections of these welds at an interval to be 
established by additional analysis 
Item No.5 - Rotor Spars. - The structural integrity of the rotor spars 
must be maintained in order to a achieve the intended design l1fe of the 
machine, and to avoid any catastrophic failures. 
Concern: In view of the growth of 
configuration, the structural integrity 
determine if adequate margin remained. 
cause spar buckling. 
rotor load levels in the as-built 
of the rotor spars was reexamined to 
If not, these higher load levels might 
Findings: The most critical spar buckling condition occurs in the front 
spar at station 880. The analysis was performed by using higher loads that 
were representative of the as-built configuration in a GO-mph wind. The cal-
culated safety factor, neglecting post-buckling strength, was 1.3. This factor 
is slightly less than the safety factor of 1.35 required by the design 
criteria. 
Recommended action: No action required. 
ltem No._ 6 - Rotor Blade Equipment Mounting Holes. - There are equipment 
mounting holes drilled in several locations in the rotor blade structure that 
are not in conformance with the Boeing design drawings. 
Concern: These holes could degrade the operational life of the rotor 
blade structure if located in high stress areas. 
Findings: During the inspections of the blades, the only holes located 
that were not called out on the BEC drawings were those used to mount the 
hydraulic and electrical lines to interior longitudinal spars. These spars 
have lower stresses than in the blade skins that form the primary airfoil sur-
face. Furthermore, since these holes are located on the neutral axis of 
secondary low stress members, they will not degrade the operational life. 
Recommended action: Recommended action prior to unattended operation is 
as follows: 
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(1) Show number, size, and location of holes, used to mount hardware, on 
the drawings. 
Nacelle 
Included in this assembly are the nacelle structure and major bearing 
supports, low-speed shaft bearings, and yaw drive system. Only the low-speed 
shaft bearings are discussed in this section, as the other two items are 
critical components discussed previously. 
Item No. 10 - Low-Speed Shaft Bearings. - The low-speed shaft (LSS) bear-
ings support the low-speed shaft and rotor. A LSS bearing failure would be 
expensive to repair, and has potentially catastrophic consequences, if the 
bearing seized due to lack of lubrication. 
Concern: Examination of oil samples removed from the LSS bearing lubrica-
tion system showed contamination levels that could significantly reduce bearing 
life. 
Findings: A review of the radial load capacity of the LSS bearings showed 
that the actual loading was well within the manufacturer's rating. 
Recommended action: Recommended action prior to attended operation is as 
follows: 
(1) Drain and clean LSS bearing sumps and refill with clean oil. 
Prior to unattended operation, recommended actions are as follows: 
(1) Install improved seals to eliminate leakage. 
(2) Install a circulating forced lubrication system. 
Drive Train 
The function of the drive train is to transmit the torque developed by 
the rotor to the generator where it is converted to electrical energy. As 
shown in figure 17, it consists of a quill shaft, gearbox, high-speed shaft, 
generator, and related couplings. Drive train loads are within design levels 
except in a few instances when drive train instabilities have occurred. 
Jtem No. 12 - Quill Shaft. - Torque is transmitted from the rotor to the 
gearbox through a torsionally compliant quill shaft. A friction coupling ;s 
used at the gearbox end of this shaft and a bolted flange joint at the rotor 
end. 
Concern: Secondary bending loads in the quill shaft were not considered 
in the original design calculations. 
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Findings: The shaft and coupling have performed well with few problems. 
During the WTl overspeed incident that occurred in June 1981 (ref. 1), the 
quill shaft carried an estimated peak torque load of 3.6 times the rated 
torque. Although the shaft was severely twisted, there were no fractures in 
the shaft, the coupling, or the bolts. There has been one incident of slipping 
in the coupling due to failure to clean the coupling friction surface prior to 
installation. 
Analysis of the quill shaft showed that the bending loads had a negligible 
effect on shaft life. Bending stresses were less than 500 psi, compared with 
the peak torsional shear stresses of 36 000 psi. This results in an increase 
of less than 1 percent in the effective stress which determines fatigue life. 
In addition, the life of the bolts which attach the friction coupling to the 
gearbox was calculated. This analysis produced a negative margin of safety 
for both the fatigue and limit load condition. This negative margin does not 
require any immediate action because of the following: 
(1) Conservative assumptions in the analysis. 
(2) The overspeed incident, which produced a torque 3.6 times the rated 
torque, did not fail these bolts or cause movement in this joint. 
Recommended action: Recommended action during unattended operation is as 
follows: 
(1) Torque check the quill shaft coupling to gearbox bolts every 1000 hr 
of operation 
Item No. 13 - Gearbox. - The three-stage epicyclic gearbox steps up the 
17.5-rpm quill shaft speed to the 1800 rpm required by the generator for 
synchronous operation. 
Concern: Another gearbox, used in a different application, produced by 
the manufacturer of the Mod-2 gearbox had a stress problem in a support leg to 
gearbox weld. 
Findings: The gearbox, shown in figure 18, has proven trouble free with 
only a few instances of lubricating oil leakage. The overspeed incident has 
shown it to be capable of sustaining high overloads without damage. During 
the incident, input torque reached 3.96xl06 ft-lb or 360 percent of rated 
torque, compared to the design limit torque of 1.65xl06 ft-lb. 
Site inspection revealed improper shimming under the feet of the gearbox 
support structure on WT2 and WT4. 
Dye penetrant inspection and strain gauging of the suspect weld on the 
Mod-2 gearbox revealed no problems. However, analysis showed that stress could 
be reduced by minor rework of the weld detail. 
Recommended action: Recommended action prior to attended operation is as 
follows: 
(1) Resh1m the gearbox support feet on WT2 and WT4 
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Recommended act~on prior to unattended operation ;s as follows: 
(1) Rework the detail at the intersection of the gearbox case and support 
structure to reduce stress in the weld 
Item_JNo. 14 - High-Speed Shaft. - The high-speed shaft (HSS), shown in 
figure 19, transmits torque from the high-speed end of the gearbox to the gen-
erator. This hollow shaft incorporates disc pack flexible couplings at both 
ends and a cha~n drive sprocket. The chain sprocket is used in conjunction 
with an electric motor and gearbox to position the rotor for maintenance and 
inspection. 
Concern: During a routine inspection of one of the wind turbines at 
Goldendale, a person from BPA reported seeing a crack in one of the disc packs. 
Findings: A subsequent inspection of the disc pack conducted by personnel 
from both BPA and BEC concluded that no crack existed. 
During the Government site inspection it was found that holes had been 
drilled at several locations through the shaft wall. Bolts through these holes 
fastened balance weights to the inside wall of the HSS. In addition, examina-
tion of the speCification used to design the HSS revealed that no cyclic load-
ing was included. However, analysis showed that even with the holes and cyclic 
loading a large positive margin of safety greater than three was maintained. 
Recommended action: Recommended action prior to unattended operation ~s 
as follows: 
(1) Show holes, used to fasten balance weights to the shaft, on the 
respective drawings 
Item No. 15 - Generator. - The generator converts the rotational energy 
of th~-dr~ve train into electrical energy. It is a three phase, 60-Hz, 4160-V 
synchronous generator, operated at 1800 rpm, and rated to provide 3125 kVA at 
0.8 power factor (i.e., 2500 kW). The generator incorporates the disk and 
calipers for the rotor parking brake, as shown in figure 17. 
Concern: A concern was raised that the vibration of rotating equipment 
in the nacelle could cause loosening of the mounting bolts and shifting of the 
generator. 
Findings: Inspection of the three machines at Goldendale showed no evi-
dence of any loosening of mounting bolts or shifting of the generator. As a 
part of the as-built review, a load and stress analysis of the generator mount-
ing bolts and support structure was conducted. Under the assumed loading it 
was shown that, except for their preload, the mounting bolts carry no signifi-
cant tensile load. stress analysis of the welded generator support structure 
showed high positive margins. 
Recommended action. - No action required. 
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NONCRITICAL ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS 
The 12 noncritical electrical components are conveniently grouped into 
three separate categories that include electrical power system, electronic 
controls, and sliprings. Unlike the mechanical sections, concerns ;n this area 
do not arise from life predictions of the electrical components themselves. 
Malfunctioning components rarely cause significant direct downtime or repair 
cost, but rather could damage the wind turbine structure by allowing structural 
overloads to occur, or by not detecting failures in process. 
As a result, most items were evaluated in terms of likelihood of failure, 
and potential effect on the wind turbine. The recurring theme is the need to 
frequently verify the functioning of the protection systems. 
Electrical Power System 
This section discusses the following five items: Vibration effects on 
generator protection relays, sUbstation and wind turbine trip coordination, 
protection adequacy, BPA substation, and tower power cable mountings. 
Item No.1B - Vibration Effects on Generator Protection Relays. - The 
generator accessory unit (GAU) relays are electrical system fault detection 
sensors (i.e., overcurrent, overtemp., etc.) used to trip the GAU breaker. 
These are standard components used in a conventional manner, except they are 
mounted in the nacelle at a 2.5 0 slope instead of level, and subjected to 
vibration. The type and function of the relays examined are listed in 
table II. 
Concern: The vibration environment might change calibration or cause 
failure of the relays. Relay failures could result in loss of the electrical 
power system protection for the wind turbine generator. 
Findings: All eleven induction disk and induction cup relays were removed 
by BPA from the GAU cabinet of W12 for investigation of calibration and envi-
ronmental effects. They were each bench operated to verify acceptable 
response. Seven relays were checked for calibration drift. These relays were 
found to be within acceptable tolerance of the original calibration points 
(see table II). 
Five of the induction disk relays were opened to permit examination of 
the shaft, bearing, and bearing surface. Figure 20 shows a back view of a 
typical induction disc relay. The disk is mounted on a vertical shaft which. 
pivots on upper and lower pins. The top bearing consists of a pin in the relay 
body which fits into a sleeve insert in the shaft. The bottom bearing consists 
of a pin which protrudes from the bottom of the disk shaft that rides on a 
jeweled surface. The disk is actuated by an induced magnetic field. The disk 
shaft is restrained by a spiral spring and its motion is retarded by a perma-
nent magnet acting on the disk to give the correct time delay. The differen-
tial relay (B7) and the loss of excitation relay (40) were not opened for 
examination because of the difficulty to "tear down". 
In all the relays checked there was no evidence of wear or damage to the 
bearings. The overcurrent relay (50/51) which was inspected had a shiny upper 
pin but no wear at this time. The permanent magnets that govern disk rotation 
26 
haVE! more dust and metal filings on the surface than what is found on similar 
relays in a substation environment. However, it was not enough to effect relay 
operation. 
Normal inspection frequency, by BPA standards, would have been 2 yr from 
the date of installation for all GAU relays except for the overcurrent relay 
which is on a three year maintenance schedule. With this 2 yr schedule, 
inspection of most relays would have occurred in the period February through 
April of 1983, if it had not been requested for this review. Because of the 
. close quarters, BPA will continue to remove the GAU relays from the cabinet in 
ordl~r to perform a bench calibration check. BPA would not expect to perform a 
relay "tear down" unless the relay operation was abnormal. 
It appeared that the GAU environment had no adverse effects on the instal-
led and tested relays with regard to calibration, reliability or wear. The 
GAU relays should continue to be checked for calibration drift and acceptable 
operation on a regularly scheduled basis. 
Recommended action: No action required. 
Item ~JJL- SUbstation and_Wind Turb-ine Trip Coordination. - There is 
no transfer trip capabi-lity between the Goodnoe Hills Substation and the Mod-2 
wind turbine system. The presence of utility power is monitored by both volt-
age and frequency monitor relays. 
Concern: In the event of a utility fault which causes the substation, 
but not the wind turbine, to trip, the wind turbine will continue to operate 
into the open substation until a microprocessor controlled shutdown is initi-
ated by a frequency. speed, or undervoltage trip. In the period before the 
shutdown is initiated, the generator output voltage might be quite high or 
low, resulting in potential damage to the wind turbine or substation. 
Findings: The frequency relay operates when the frequency drifts below 
59.5 Hz or above 60.5 Hz. The relay takes some 8 to 10 sec to operate in a 
low to high frequency environment. The voltage on the output side of the bus 
tie connection unit (BTCU) must drop from 12.5 to 5.5 kV before a trip occurs. 
The power drop.would result in brownout conditions to local loads before the 
undervoltage relays operated. 
The signal from these relays is used by the nacelle control unit (NCU) to 
indicate an absence of utility power. A significant amount of time (ranging 
from 8 sec to more than 1 min) can pass before the NCU senses and responds to 
a loss of utility power. An added trip contact placed in series with the con-
tacts of relays 94X and 36V (see fig. 21) would provide an immediate signal to 
the NCU of loss of utility power resulting in WT shutdown. 
Recommended action: Recommended action prior to unattended operation is 
as fo 11 ows : 
(I) Provide transfer trip capability between substation and wind turbine 
Jtem No_~20 .-- Protection Adegua~. - The electrical protection system 
consists of a set of protective relays sensing electrical system faults such 
as overcurrents and frequency or voltage errors. When any of these sensors 
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trip or the wind turbine control system senses a fault, the 48V dc battery 
system is used to energize a solenoid which trips the GAU or BTCU breaker. 
Concern: The concern in protection adequacy involves the general adequacy 
of the generator protection system. The design is based on a standard utility 
practice, and uses an appropriate assortment of sensors in a conventional man-
ner. These systems have been shown to be highly reliable and have not caused 
a problem in the Mod-2 or other DOE/NASA wind turbine programs. However, this 
type of generator protection system was developed for plants where the normal 
operation is for the generator to stay on line for long periods of time, and 
the requirement is to maintain generation, if at all possible. Thus, failure 
modes generally leave the generator on line and backup protection is provided 
by the next set of sensors and breakers. In contrast, a wind turbine is 
expected to shut down when the wind is too low or too high, and because of the 
small size, maintaining generation from any single wind turbine is not crit-
ical. A failure which results in not being able to disconnect the generator 
from the utility grid during a shutdown will typically result in the generator 
trying to motor the wind turbine, with the tips feathered. The resulting over-
load could damage the generator, and possibly the drive train due to torque 
pulses, as the generator slips poles. 
Findings: There are two classes of situations which would result in a 
serious failure. The first is the combination of loss of the protection 
system, which could be undetected, and the occurrence of a generator fault or 
utility system fault, which ;s not isolated by the substation. This situation 
is common with all utility generators, where, due to the equipment reliability, 
normal maintenance practices, and the backup protection from the substation, it 
is an acceptably small risk. Some reliability improvement can be obtained 
through redundancy. Dual wires through the sliprings are currently used, but 
a second tripping relay could be added. Also, more frequent battery mainten-
ance and better physical protection would help, However, the current battery 
maintenance and level of redundancy are adequate. 
The second class of situations with higher potential for a serious failure 
is a loss of the 48V system combined with a normal shutdown. Due to the fre-
quency of normal shutdowns, this is far more plausible. The 48V system ;s 
highly reliable but does have single failure points. Frequent battery checks 
and improved physical battery protection would lessen the odds of failure. 
Also, adding a loss of 48V (no-volt) trip to the breaker, or providing an 
equivalent alternate tripping scheme would provide safe failure modes. 
Recommended action: Recommended action during attended operation is as 
follows: 
(1) Install protective cover on 48V battery 
Recommended action prior to unattended operation is as follows: 
(1) Install no-volt trip to the BTCU breaker 
Item No 21 ~ BPA Substation. - The BPA substation is the link between the 
wind turbine cluster and the utility distribution system. The wind turbine 
outputs, at a 12.S-kV level, are combined at the substation, and transformed 
up to the 69-kV utility distribution voltage. The substation also contains 
sensors and breakers to protect the utility system. 
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Concern: Two occurrences have caused outages at the Goodnoe Hills Sub-
station, shutting down all three generators. 
Findings: BPA Engineering, and Operations and Maintenance personnel 
inspected the Goodnoe Hills Substation facility as part of the review. The 
cable termination cabinet was the location of the latest occurrence causing an 
outage. All three 12.S-kV phase cables from each of three WTs terminate in 
this cabinet. The bus to which they are attached was not adequate to support 
the cable weight. This resulted in a phase bus-to-ground fault in June 1982, 
causing damage to two cable terminations and the phase bus. This problem was 
corrected by installing cable hangers and a support bar in the cabinet. The 
termination arrangement does not isolate the individual underground conductors. 
This could lead to all three units being out of service as a result of a single 
power cable failure. 
Ihe bypass and disconnect switches were single phase with no correlation 
between adjacent switches. It was difficult, if not impossible, for the oper-
ator to trace connections to these switches. The switches were hot-stick 
operated. There was no interlocking between the present switches. 
The power circuit breaker recloser has functioned satisfactorily except 
for one incident where a rodent climbed on the bushings causing a flashover 
and extensive damage. 
Also considered was the provision of alternative station service from the 
Public Utility District of Klickitat County1s l2.S-kV distribution lines 
located south of the WT site. 
The conclusions reached include the following: 
(1) Outage time in the event of a fault could be reduced by expanding the 
selection and number of spare components. 
(2) 1he acquisition of a different termination cabinet could provide auto-
matic isolation of a faulted cable, manual isolation of each WTG underground 
cable set, and improved cable terminations, through fused disconnect switches. 
This would permit operation of units not directly affected by a substation 
fault. 
(3) Disconnect switches are available with dead-front control, group-
operated and key interlocked. Replacement with this different kind of switch 
would correct the problems with the present switch arrangement. 
Recommended action: Recommended actions prior to unattended operation 
an~ as follows: 
(1) Increase inventory of substation equipment spare parts 
(2) Install screening beneath the recloser to prevent entry of rodents 
Item No. 22 - Tower Power Cable Mountings. - Three individually jacketed 
cab 1 es- areusedtocarr-;'the 4.' 6-kV alternator output to the base of the 
tower. These conductors are secured by individual metal clamps (see fig. 22) 
to the cable ladder. These clamps are placed about 1.5 ft apart, at every 
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ladder rung, except one rung is skipped at the cable ladder extension joints 
(every 12 ft) (see fig. 23). Nylon tie-wraps are used to secure the 2/0 
neutral cable to the ladder. 
Concern: Excessive distance between clamps and clamping mechanisms for 
the three phase conductors from the nacelle through the yaw slipring assembly 
terminations and down the tower cable ladder might result in failure of the 
cable insulation. 
Findings: The high voltage power cables which run from the generator to 
the yaw slipring assembly had a free run of about 5 ft in length between the 
point where they emerge from the nacelle floor conduit and attach to the slip 
ring terminations. The three phase conductors were tied off and supported by 
a nylon rope in WT3 and nylon tie-wrap in WT2 (see figure 24). The suspension 
tether supported the conductor weight and relieves strain on the rotation side 
termination elbows. WTI was partially disassembled following the LSS failure 
in November 1982 so its method of suspension could not be determined. 
BPA/BEC inspected the power cable runs in all three units at Goldendale. 
In WT2 four cable clamps were observed to be lightly pinching the outer hypalon 
coating. The four clamps were all located near station 410 but were spaced 
out and attached to different phases. No damage to the plastic insulation or 
conductor strands was apparent. 
Two cable ladder joints were found loose at the bolted expansion joint in 
WT2 near station 2000 and in WT3 near station 500. 
·(he major conclusion was that no damage to the conductors or ladder was 
apparent. All clamps and joints will be monitored and corrected as required 
during future maintenance activity. 
Recommended action: Recommended actions during attended operation are as 
fo Ilows: 
(1) Correct cable clamp pinching 
(2) Tighten loose cable ladder joints 
Electronic Controls 
lhis section discusses the following four items: Low-speed shaft bearing 
fai·lure detection, overspeed sensing adequacy, fault memory retention, and CRT 
shutdowns. 
Jj:~m No! .... 23= .. Jow-~eed Shaft Bearing Failure Detection. - The low-speed 
shaft bearings are critical to the structural integrity of the wind turbine. 
Although these bearings support the rotor, a bearing failure which allows the 
rotor and low· speed shaft to separate is not plausible. Although unlikely. a 
bearing failure causing the shaft to seize and possibly overload the rotor or 
shaft torsionally is plausible. Simply replacing a bearing is a major task in 
that the rotor and low· speed shaft must be removed to replace the bearing. 
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Concern: Undetected incipient failure of low-speed shaft bearings might 
result in a major failure. 
Findings: In the present design, temperature sensors are used to detect 
failure of the bearings and cause a shutdown. However, temperatures will not 
warn of impending failure; such as when the WT2 machine aft bearing had no 
lubricant due to the low-bearing speed, high-thermal mass, and h1gh-thermal 
conduction situation present in the Mod-2. Vibration sensors were also incor-
porated in the design, but they did not detect the shock pulses generated by 
the low-speed shaft failure. Although these sensors were functioning, the 
bedplate did not see high g levels (0.1 to 0.2 g) during the failure. 
Various sensor systems applicable to bearings were considered, such as 
lubricant level, lubrication flow, lubrication pressure, lubrication tempera-
ture, proximity probes, and noise sensors. The lubrication level sensor system 
was found to be adequate based on ease of installation and reliability 
considerations. 
Recommended action: Recommended action prior to unattended operation is 
as follows: 
(1) Incorporate LSS bearing lubrication level sensors. 
Jtem No. 24 - Overspeed Sensing Adequac~. - WTG overspeed is probably the 
most common cause of catastrophic machine failure. Consequently, overs peed 
protection has been the subject of extensive design and review, particularly 
after the overspeed incident of June 1981. However, that effort concentrated 
on protection and actions after the overspeed was detected. 
Concern: The concern was not due to any inspection or analysis, but as a 
result of general sensitivity to overs peed detection and generating the shut-
down commands. 
Findings: The overspeed protection was analyzed through a review of the 
schematic drawing (B[C 032-457013 sh-l and 032-457025 sh-2) and a discussion 
of maintenance procedures. Circuit analysis was performed by BEC and NASA. 
-Ihe sensing, shown in figure 25, consists of two encoders of similar but 
not identical installation and manufacture, thus eliminating the likelihood of 
s1multaneous generic failures. One sensor used for the speed control function, 
also generates the primary overspeed signal which actuates the start and stop 
valves. This circuitry, located in the microprocessor rack was used continu-
ously during normal running. Thus, most failures were detectable and failsafe 
or had a built-in backup mode, such as feathering the blade with servo valves 
if the start and stop valves did not function. 
lhe backup overspeed circuitry used the second encoder, and was processed 
through circuitry also located in the microprocessor chassis. Overspeeds 
detected by thi~ circuitry actuate the independent emergency shutdown system 
(lESS) valves. A portion of the circuitry was checked against the primary 
spE!ed sensor, providing a self-check feature, and some of the c'rcuitry was 
fa'lsafe. However, a portion of the circuitry was neither failsafe nor self-
checked, and could have become an undetected failure, defeating the purpose of 
the I[SS. 
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The analysis identified two methods to improve the design. The most 
effective method was to institute periodic testing of the system. This 
required injecting a signal in place of the encoder output and checking for 
actuation of the lESS valves. The second improvement involved adding circuitry 
to cause a microprocessor shutdown if the oscillator used in the overspeed 
circuitry fails. The oscillator was singled out for this internal checking 
because it was easy to check and also is inherently less reliable than the rest 
of the circuitry which was not checked. 
Recommended action: Recommended action prior to attended operation is as 
follows: 
(1) Perform functional check of the overspeed sensor circuit 
Recommended action during unattended operation is as follows: 
(1) Incorporate periodic functional check in routine maintenance 
ltem No. J5 - Fault Memory Retention. - Operational data and the control 
system record of history preceding a fault shutdown are currently displayed on 
the CR1 used for remote or local control. The only permanent record of this 
data is that which is written down by the operator. 
Concern: Operational and failure data captured prior to and during a 
fault, required to diagnose the cause, could now be lost through operator error 
or loss of station service. 
Findings: The nacelle control unit (NCU) retains history data in memory 
which includes some operating parameters and fault code information. The 
parameters stored include wind turbine operating mode, power output level, and 
blade rotational speed. The fault code, displayed in hexidecimal, can be 
decoded to determine the kind of fault(s) that caused shutdown. 
One minute of history data ;s stored and refreshed every second. These 
data represent 10 sec of operation prior to shutdown followed by 50 sec after 
the shutdown is initiated. In addition, 6 sec of history data are stored and 
refreshed every 0.1 sec. These data represent 1 sec of operation prior to 
shutdown followed by 5 sec after shutdown initiation. 
Review of this history data might aid the troubleshooting procedure and 
assist in determining parts, tools, and maintenance experience required to 
correct the problem. The history data, available for display on the CRT, . 
should be recorded by an operator. A printer would provide a hard copy of NCU 
fault codes, fault history, and provide operational data. Experience has shown 
that occasionally the operators did not or could not record the fault 
information. 
Recommended ac ti on: ... Recommended acti on pri or to unattended operati on is 
as follows: 
(1) Add hard copy print capability to display terminals 
Item No. 26 - CRT Shutdowns. -- The utility or local operator monitors and 
controls the wind turbine operation through the local or remote CRTls connected 
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to the wind turbine through a communication link. The link may be hardwired or 
use telephone lines, radios, or microwaves. 
Concern: A hardware failure would result in the loss of displayed opera-
tional data, history data, local manual mode operation, and remote machine 
disable. Currently this loss is not alarmed and would only be noted by observ-
ing the loss of displayed information. Thus, the loss of manual supervisory 
control could result from the following hardware failures: 
(a) CRT screen display or keyboard failure 
(b) Communications link to the remote CRT (modems and microwave 
transmitter/receiver) 
(c) Data and control link drivers in NCU may fail 
Findings: utility operating philosophy permits continued conventional 
generator operation with loss of manual supervisory control, if so alarmed to 
perm,t possible dispatch of an operator to the site. However, loss of manual 
supervisory control of an operating WTG might not be acceptable. 
An answerback feature could be added to the CRT display terminal (see 
figure 26). Software added to the NCU would send a signal to the local and 
remote CRT's, which would echo back an 10 message response to the NCU. If the 
answerback loop is broken, then an alarm is initiated at the local and remote 
terminals. A message counter would be added to the remote receiver line to 
power the remote alarm. This scheme will check all wires and circuits of the 
transmit and receive serial links for proper function. 
To obtain a hard copy failure printout, a microprocessor could be used. 
This is part of a system being developed by BEC to provide operation availa-
bility data. It is configured to connect to the extension port of the 
termi na 1 . 
Recommended action: Recommended action prior to unattended operation is 
a <; fo 11 ows: 
('I) Add answerback feature hardware and software to the display terminals 
Sliprings 
lhis section discusses the following three items: Yaw slipring, low-speed 
shaft slipring, and low- speed shaft slipring bearing . 
. Lt~r!L.No.!.._2?_=--- Ya~~JJ.J2I.iilll. - The yaw slipring is used to transmit the 
,alternator power output, and all of the control, signal, and data lines across 
the yaw interface. 
Concern: The three concerns in this area are as follows: 
(1) Brush wear material might contaminate the sliprings resulting in heat 
bui ldup and failure of the snprings. 
(2) Degradation of the insulation quality of the molded high voltage (HV) 
cable boots at the yaw slipring interface by oil contamination. 
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(3) The anti rotation bracket may place bending loads into the assembly 
which could preload the slipring bearings. 
Findings: The yaw sliprings were to be inspected for brush wear annually 
per the Operations and Maintenance Manual. The yaw sliprings were inspected 
on WT2 and WT3 during their annual maintenance in 1982. WTl was inspected 
following the overspeed incident in June 1981. There was no evidence that 
bru~h wear is a current problem to the life of the yaw slipring assembly. 
BlC nonconformance reports (NCR's) documented that oil leaks in the 
nacelle were resulting in oil dripping onto, or potentially dripping onto the 
HV cables where they attach to the yaw slipring. (See fig. 27.) Oil will 
eventually deteriorate the insulation of the HV cables, and both the insulation 
and semiconducting coating of the molded HV connectors, causing faults between 
phases and from phase to ground. 
The anti rotation bracket on WT2 (see figure 28) showed some deformation 
where the existing bolts, that act as anti rotation restraints were attached. 
Inspections of this installation and others give the impression that misalign-
ment might exist between the rotating and stationary fixtures of the yaw slip-
ring assembly. This could cause bending loads to be placed on the assembly by 
the anti rotation brackets and bolt restraints. 
Recommended action: Recommended actions prior to unattended operation 
are as follows: 
(1) Inspect the sliprings for contamination and measure resistance on the 
power rings 
(2) Inspect and replace the molded HV cable termination boots as 
required, and install a drip shield to prevent further oil contamination 
(3) Replace the existing anti rotation restraint with an improved design 
which can not load the yaw slipring 
Item No~ 28 - Low-Speed Shaft Sliprill[. - The low- speed shaft slipring, 
located on the low-speed shaft just forward of the rear bearing, transfers the 
following from the rotor and low-speed shaft to the nacelle: 
(1) Control and data signals 
(2) Power for the pitch hydraulic system and the crack detector 
(3) Commands to the start and stop valves and the backup overs peed 
protection (lESS) valves. 
Concern: The rapid brush wear on the low-speed shaft slipring could 
result in ring--to-ring shorts that could cause loss of sensors or control 
capability. 
Findings: The low-speed shaft slipring was reviewed for progress on 
reducing the rapid brush wear experienced in the field, and the potential 
effects of the wear, such as shorts in the slipring. Rapid wear has been a 
continuing problem, in that there have been instances of ring separator break-
age and ring shorts. The unexplained short which caused the shutdown when the 
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low-speed shaft cracked was generally attributed to the slipring. Ring-to-ring 
shorts due to separator failures and/or brush material deposits could be likely 
with the current design and associated wear rates. Most shorts tripped 
breakers or simulated fault conditions which caused safe shutdown. Depending 
upon the assignment of sliprings to control signals, ring-to-ring shorts could 
cause loss of sensors or control capability. In general, rings were found to 
be assigned to separate power signals from low 'level signals, and used 
grounded rings or empty rings to isolate critical circuits. 
The brush wear data were reviewed, and the available general status is as 
follows: 
(1) Reduced spring tension generally showed marked improvement in brush 
1 He. 
(2) Brush materials did not show a strong effect on life. 
(3) The vendor'S simulation showed very good brush life. 
(4) Test data (not taken on Mod-2) showed a dramatic life degradation due 
to either very high or very low humidity. The humidity was not controlled in 
the Mod-2 installation, and might be significant. 
(5) There was some feeling that the cantilever support for the brush 
assembly might affect the wear rate due to brush vibration. 
(&) The maintenance procedures were appropriate and were not significantly 
affecting brush life. 
The brush life investigation is an on going activity which should be con-
tinued at the present level of activity. Current life is on the order of 3 mo 
to 1 yr. 
The slipring aSSignments were reviewed 
effect of all adjacent ring-to-ring shorts. 
fa,lsafe shutdowns. However, the following 
could cause undetected failures: 
in detail by BEC to determine the 
Most shorts resulted in immediate 
potential adjacent ring shorts 
(1) Short - ring 23 to 24: This short bypasses the crack detection 
sensors, in effect disabling the crack detection system. 
(2) Short - ring 24 to 25: This short applies the crack detector command 
voltage to the crack detector sensor, resulting in a loss of crack 
detector function. 
(3) Short - ring 20 to 21: This short results in a loss of the pitch 
hydraulic oil high-temperature sensor. Damage is limited to hydrau11c 
system components. 
(4) Short - ring 1& to 17: Loss of pitch-system fluid level sensor could' 
result in loss of system pressure, causing a safe shutdown. Damage 
is limited to the hydraulic system. 
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(5) Short - rings 9 to 10, 28 to 29, or 32 to 33: These shorts result in 
loss of one or both ice detectors. 
The only serious slipring shorting concerns were the crack detection 
rings. A control system self check should be implemented to check for proper 
detector operation, and rings 25 and 26 interchanged. In the long term, the 
slipring design should be changed to strengthen the separators and reassign 
the rings to eliminate the secondary concerns, but this is not necessary for 
the research test operations. In general, end-to-end checks are required to 
verify proper function and should be performed at 6 mo or 1 yr intervals. 
Recommended action: Recommended action prior to unattended operation is 
as follows: 
(1) Implement a self check of the crack detection system and interchange 
rings 25 and 26. 
Item No. __ fi..::-_Low-Speed Shaft Slipring Bearing. - The slipring design is 
a brush set and dust cover over the slipring that ;s cantilevered off a large-
diameter thin ball bearing. The ball bearing is not a standard design, being 
split so that it can be assembled over the shaft. 
Concern: The original slipring bearing had failed in one unit resulting 
in a somewhat undefined but apparently safe shutdown by ripping out the wiring 
to the slipring. The review committee was concerned with the possible reoccur-
rence of this failure, and assessed the adequacy of the present mechanical 
design and the shutdown mode if the failure did occur. 
Findings: lhe previous failure was analyzed by BEC, and was felt to have 
been due to failure of the wire ball separator. The redesign incorporated a 
brass separator in the bearing and an improved torque link. The design bearing 
load was two orders of magnitude greater than the estimated actual load. 
Proposed changes in this area, as a result of the low-speed shaft redeSign, 
specified the addition of a second support bushing, to minimize vibrations 
transferred from the brushes to the holder. Based on an inspection of the 
actual hardware, and an analysis in the previous section (LSS Slipring) of the 
effects of adjacent ring shorts, and the load calculations, there was no justi-
fication for changes or increased inspections for unattended operations. 
Recommended action: No action required. 
~UMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations of the Government Review Committee discussed in detall 
in the previous section are summarized in table III for the critical compon-
ents; table IV, for all other or noncritical structural and mechanical compon-
ents; and table V, for noncritical electrical components. In order to 
establish an urgency or suggested time frame for implementing the recommenda· 
tions, the recommendations were grouped in the following four categories: 
(1) Prior to attended operation 
(2) During attended operation 
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(3) Prior to unattended operation 
(4) During unattended operation 
CONCLUSIONS 
The major conclusions reached by the Government Review Committee are as 
follows: 
1. There were no deficiencies identified in this review process that would 
preclude planned attended operation of WT2 and WT3. However, some of the con-
cerns required immediate corrective action and/or careful inspection at fre-
quent intervals during the attended operation. 
2. Several of the components reviewed such as the teeter bearing and rotor 
cap areas have potentially serious deficiencies that require corrective action 
in order to increase the operational life of the machines in the unattended 
mode of operation. 
3. The recommended disassembly of the teeter bearing in WTl was necessary 
to provide information for any additional corrective action and/or design 
modifications that might be required for the unattended mode of operation. 
Additional input and assessment such as the effect of temperature during 
installation and operation was needed from the vendor supplying the elastomeric 
bearing material. 
4. Additional loads data, specifically for the rotor cap. yaw drive 
system, and downwind bearing support were needed to resolve the concerns 
expressed as well as to confirm the recommended corrective actions. 
5. Design practice by the contractor regarding widespread use of friction 
joints and plastic shim material contributed to problems in the field. Use of 
shear pins, locking devices, and hard material shim stock should be considered 
wherever practical. 
6. Most of the items in the electrical area were evaluated in terms of 
likelihood of failure, and the potential effect on the wind turbines. The 
recurring theme was the strong requirement for repeated functional checks to 
assure the proper operation of all protective systems. 
I. Implementation of quality control procedures during the installation 
of the Mod-·2 wind turbines was inadequate. Numerous instances of improper 
installation (e.g., use of wrong fasteners, improperly aligned components, 
etc.) were identified during the as-built review. These instances were primar-
ily due to failure to follow installation instructions. However, a contribut-
ing factor was incomplete or vague instructions on some of the Mod-2 drawings. 
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APPENDIX A 
MEMO ESTABLISHING GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE 
4513 January 27, 1983 
TO: 4100/Chief, Transportation Propulsion Division 
FROM: 4510/Manager, Wind Energy Project Office 
SUBJECT: Appointment of Mod-2 As-Built Review Committee 
This memo establishes a government committee to conduct an as-built review 
of the three Mod-2 wind turbine units at Goldendale, Washington. The objective 
of this review is to identify any design or fabrication deficiencies which 
could potentially cause safety hazards or significant periods of downtime for 
repairs. Recommendations for corrective actions are also to be made by the 
committee. This as-built review is the first step in a program of preventive 
maintenance which was recommended by the committee investigating the recent 
low-speed shaft failures at Goldendale and supported by DOE/NASA management. 
I have asked William R. Johnson, Deputy Manager of the Mod-5 Project, to head 
this committee. Bill is well-qualified for this assignment, having 
successfully completed the technical management of the SVU Project for the 
Bureau of Reclamation. In addition, he is in an excellent position to 
transfer to the Mod-5 Project the lessons learned on the Mod-2. A list of the 
government personnel requested to serve on this committee is as follows: 
Name Qrgani zatiQil Speci a Hi. 
W. R. Johnson, Chr. Wind Energy Project Office Project Management 
T. L. Sullivan Wind Energy Project Office Loads and Stresses 
A. G. Birchenough Wind Energy Project Office Electro-Mechanical 
Components 
B. S. Linscott Wi nd Energy Project Office Structura 1 Components 
P. J. Sirocky Engineering Design Div. Mechanical Components 
W. E. B. Mason Reliability & Qua 1 ity QA and Materials 
Assurance Office 
TBD Bonneville Power Admin. Electrical Components 
The committee will work closely with the Mod-2 contractor, Boeing Engineering 
and Construction of Seattle, which will supply required support services and 
data such as detail drawings, inspection reports, test data, and engineering 
analysis. All liaison with BEC will be provided by the Mod-2 Project Manager. 
Findings, conclusions, and recommendations of this committee will be presented 
.to the Lewis Wind Energy Project Office Chief Engineer by April 15, 1983, with 
a written report to follow within 15 days. Resulting recommendations and 
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project plans will be presented to DOE and NASA Headquarters management 
personnel in late April or early May 1983. To define the scope of the review, 
the committee will first list the critical assemblies and components to be 
investigated and obtain the concurrence of the WEPO Chief Engineer before 
starting detailed study. 
Darrell H. Baldwin 
cc :: 
BPJ\jW. Myers 
BPII/O. Seeley 
BPJ\jG. Steml er 
BEe/M. Bovarnik 
BuRec/W. Fite 
OOE/L. Divone 
DOE! O. Ancona 
OOUP. Goldman 
NASA-HQ/R. Wasel, RET-l 
4510/WEPO Files 
4510/0. Baldwin 
4510/L. Gordon 
4510/1. Cahi 11 
4510/8. Linscott 
4510/W. Johnson 
4512/R. Puthoff 
4512/A. Birchenough 
4513/T. Sullivan 
4513/0. Spera 
8200/R. Rohal 
8220/W. Mason 
8500/J. Yuska 
8512/P. Sirocky 
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APPENDIX B 
GOVERNMENT SITE INSPECTIONS 
On February 24, 1983, members of the Government committee inspected the 
Med1cine Bow machine and on March 7 and 8 inspected the Goldendale units. 
These inspections were unstructured assessments in support of the Boeing 
effort. 
The following notation is used in the discussion: 
Wll, WT2, and WT3 - Goldendale units 
WT4 - Medicine Bow unit 
(a) Denotes items not identified by Boeing during their inspections 
(b) Denotes conditions indicative of substandard workmanship and/or 
quality control 
MANLIFTS 
WTl, WT2. and WT3. - Condition of units appeared good. 
WT4. - Condition of the manlift was good, but the entrance to the manlift 
was loosely constructed of discarded lumber and railroad ties. b 
TOWER-TO-BASE ATTACHMENl 
WTl and WT2. - General evidence of disturbed paint observed on nuts; grout 
cracking evident. 
WT3. - No evidence of nut movement observed, grout cracking evident. 
WT4. - No evidence of nut movement observed, not inspected for grout 
cracking. 
the 
not 
was 
Wll, WT2, and WT3. 
lift to the nacelle. 
judged to be grossly 
observed. 
TOWERS 
These towers were observed on the inside only during 
Mismatch was observed, particularly in WTl but was 
out of specification. No power cable tray movement 
WT3. - This tower was more 
no serious condition was noted. 
thoroughly inspected than the others, however. 
Documented for the record are the following: 
(1) Mismatch judged to be minor 
(2) Minor porosity 
(3) Possible power cable tray movement 
(4) Evidence of weld repair 
(5) Minor banding 
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YAW DRIVES 
WI1, WT2, and WT3. - Evidence of excessive bull gear wear and pinion m\s-
alignment. a 
WT4. - Bull gear wear and pinion misalignment were not noted but could be 
present. a 
WT4 .. - A potentiometer attached to the pinion with a belt drive was in 
disrepair. The belt was very loose, the shaft support was loose and misaligned, 
and the use of washer stacks 8 to 10 washers deep was judged unacceptable. 
GENERATOR MOUNTS 
WI1, WT2, and WT3. - Generator mounts were not inspected for these sites. 
WT4. - The generator is not sitting on a full bearing; this is not thought 
to be serious. 
GEARBOX SUPPORTS 
WTl and WT3. - Gearbox mounts appeared tight to the mount in all areas. 
WT2 and WT4. - Gearbox mounts had noticeable gaps on both legs. On WT4 
the gap exceeded 0.040 in. a b 
REAR BEARING SUPPORT 
WI2, WT3, and WT4. - All machines showed evidence of gaps under bottom 
and or side mounting pads which could lead to early fatigue failures. b All 
machines show cracked paint on the reaction member indicative of high loading 
and flexing. 
LOW-SPEED SHAFT 
WT2 and WT3. - Paint had been removed from critical areas but there was 
much to be desired in the thoroughness of the action. Rust had set in on all 
bare metal areas. 
WT4. -- An excellent job of paint removal had been accomplished; there was 
no rust present. 
TEETER BEARING 
WI1. - Movement was apparent in the bearing-to-hub assembly, although not 
as pronounced as for WT4. There was slight ozone like cracking of the elasto-
mer, but to a far less extent that at WT4.a Weld cracking in the elastomer 
mount was not observed. 
WT2 ... Movement was apparent in the bearing-to-hub mount. One mount of 
thE! horse collar attaching bolts showed washer movement of approximately 0.125 
in. There was minor deterioration of the elastomer similar to WT1.a Both 
sides of the elastomer mount showed possible weld cracking. a 
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WT3. - Movement was not apparent through casual observat10n. Elastomer 
deterioration is minor as in WT1.a Weld cracking was not observed. 
WT4. - Movement was apparent in the bearing-to-hub mount. The elastomer 
was deteriorated as evidence by ozone like cracking. At least one side of the 
elastomer mount weld was cracked. 
TEETER BRAKE 
WT2 and WT3. - Brake was disconnected. Wear was apparent. but could not 
be readily seen due to ra;n impairing access. 
WT4. - Brake was disconnected and severely damaged by abnormal wear. 
Torn metal was clearly visible along with galling and possible bolt movement. 
ROTOR CAP 
WT1, WT2, WT3, and WT4. - All machines had eight auxiliary holes appar-
ently drilled for mounting hydraulic and electrical lines. a 
WT1. - Inside: 
bars were observed. 
was observed in one 
WT2. - Inside: 
and a flame cut hole 
approximately 1 by 2 
use of backing bars. 
HUB CENTER SECTION 
Not inspected. Outside: General poor use of backing 
On one side of the spar approximately 50 percent mismatch 
area. 
Observed was the questionable application of backing bars 
on the tension face near the center line and neutral axis 
in by 0.375 in deep.a Outside: Observed general poor 
WT3. - Inside and outside: 
bars had been removed. 
Generally okay in that most of the backing 
WT4. - Inside: Inspection of the main central spar at one end revealed 
paint cracks in the fillets and general poor use of backing bars. Outside: 
Observed general poor use of backing bars. 
MIDSECTIONS 
WT1. - Only one blade was inspected - no discrepancies were noted except 
poor use of backing bars. 
WT2. - Five of the six compartments were walked through. A heavy slag-
like deposit was observed at the 360 joint of one blade. Poor use of backing 
bars was obvious. 
WT3. - At least one case of incomplete weld repair was noted. At a chord-
wise weld to bulkhead connection, porosity in a partially ground area was 
obvious. Most of the backing bars have been removed from these midsections. 
WT4. - Five of six compartments were walked through. The only question-
able area was again the poor application of backing bars. 
TIP CONTROLS POSITION SENSORS 
WT1, WT2, and WT3. - Observed tip sensors appeared in good condition. 
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WT4. - One sensor had at least one cracked lock ~asher, and the other tip 
had a control box potent~ometer mounted in an askewed position with flat washer 
stacks used to create an angle cond~tion.a b 
WATER IN BLADES 
WTI. - This blade was on the ground. Water was condensed in the midsec-
t-iOI1S and hubs. 
WT2. - Large amounts of water (gallons) had accumulated in this machine. 
probably due to the configuration of the crack detection system when the blade 
was parked vertically. 
WT3. The same condition was found as with WT2 but less water. 
WT4 .. This blade was essentially dry. 
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APPENDIX C 
AS-BUILT REVIEW LOADS 
A major reason for calculated lives of Mod-2 subsystems now being less 
than 30 yr was the increase in loading over that used in design. The three 
Mod-2 wind turbines at Goldendale were instrumented to measure loading in the 
blades, drive train, and tower. The blades were instrumented at four spanwise 
stations for measuring flatwise and chordwise bending moments; the quill shaft 
was instrumented to measure torque and bending moments in two perpendicular 
directions; and the tower was instrumented to measure torque and bending 
moments. (See table VI.) 
Blade load measurements at Goldendale showed that while steady flatw;se 
loading and steady and cyclic chordwise loading were close to design, cyclic 
flatwise loading was significantly greater than design. At spanwise station 
370 this loading was about 50 percent greater than design; at station 1'64 it 
was about twice design. This loading then translates into higher cyclic load-
ing in the rotor cap and teeter bearing, LSS thrust bearing, a portion of the 
nacelle, and the tower. 
certain loads used during the review for calculation of subsystem static 
capability and fatigue lives were compared to design loads in table VII. As 
the table shows, the most significant increase occurred in the cyclic thrust 
load at the hub. This higher loading results in reduced fatigue performance 
in the rotor cap. nacelle, and tower. Another significant increase occurred 
in the teeter-stop impact loading. This increase has produced negative margins 
of safety in the teeter-stop structure and between the rotor cap and low-speed 
shaft joint. None of the remaining increases in loading listed in table VII 
had a significant effect on static or fatigue performance. 
There were several areas where additional instrumentation would improve 
confidence in the accuracy of the loads used to calculate subsystem life. 
Extrapolation of measured rotor and tower loads through the rotor cap and 
nacelle ;s uncertain. In addition, site influence on certain loads was 
unclear. Many of these uncertainties could be resolved by additional instru-
mentation and testing at Goldendale. Resolution of site-to-site differences 
will require limited additional loads instrumentation and testing at Solano or 
Medicine Bow. 
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!'-P.f~ND gJl 
~OMPONE.Nl.J:cIFE. OR TIME-TO-REPAIR CALCULATIONS 
Many of the recommendations in this report are the result of calculations 
which show a component fatigue life or the time to repair a weld is less than 
the Mod-2 design life of 30 yr. These calculation~ are based on a fracture 
mechanics approach, and presume the existence of a crack-like defect in the 
structural material. In addition, the analysis is based on a set of general 
assumptions and a set of specific assumptions, which depend on the location of 
the presumed defect. 
The general assumptions used in the analysis are JS follows: 
(1) The gauge thickness is nominal. 
(2) l'he defect is oriented with respect to the principal stresses to 
maximize stress intensity. 
(3) The loading is phased to maximize peak stress. 
The specific assumptions used in the analysis are listed in the following 
table. 
-
Deflect location Defect Cyclic Weld Weld stress 
dimensions, frequency distortion, magn Hi cati on 
----
Rotor chordwise weld 
Rotor spindle 
Rotor cap pilot ring 
Rotor cap gusset wel 
lower circumferentia 
welds 
Nace"lle weld 
s 
d 
1 
in 
(see sketch below) 
- --
d w 
--_._ ... _---
-'-' 
0.05 0.25 
.03 .09 
.03 .09 
.05 .25 
.1t .5t 
.05 .25 
in 
(sink in or 
IIbandingll) 
---
1 pel rev 0.1 ---.-
-
___ w 
-, 
---
- (a) 
2 per rev .125 ---
2 per rev - (a) 
aDerived from weld code fatigue allowables, value dependent on category of weld 
detail. 
lhe following figure shows a sample with dimensions d, depth; t, sample 
thickness; and w, width. 
I1 
lhe loading used in the analysis was based on measured cyclic and cal-
culated mean loads, and was dependent on windspeed. Calculations were made 
for two windspeed distributions. One was the measured distribution at the 
Goldendale site, and the other was the Mod-2 design windspeed distribution. 
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The latter was a We1bull distribut10n for a site with an average w1ndspeed of 
14 mph at 30 ft. The Weibull distribution produced more severe loading than 
the Goldendale distribution, and therefore, shorter lives or time to repair. 
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APPENDIX E 
ROTQR.CRACK DETECTION SYSTEM 
lhe rotor crack detection system incorporated in the Mod-2 was designed 
to detect a through-thickness crack in the rotor blade, before this crack 
reached a critical length. The system would then shut the wind turbine down 
to prevent a catastrophic failure of the rotor. 
System Operation 
The system pumps compressed warm dry air through the blade interior and 
vents the air overboard at the inboard end through an orifice. The flow into 
each blade ;s monitored, and the difference between blade flows ;s an indica-
tion of the existence of another exhausting orifice, which could indicate a 
through-crack. The differential measurement between the two blades eliminates 
effects like temperature and atmospheric pressure changes. An orifice in the 
blade allows some flow, so that thermal expansion does not overpressurize the 
blade, and to allow a no-·flow check for a blocked system. 
A low-speed shaft mounted compressor pressurizes the blade to 1.0 psig 
from station 90 out through the pitchable tip. The trailing edge sections of 
the tip are not pressurized. The system operates whenever the machine ;s 
synchronized, but requ1res 20 min to stabilize. 
The system sensitivity was selected to enable detection of a 12-in crack 
at station 360. A 12-in crack at station 360 would grow to the critical crack 
length of 28 in during an estimated 10 hr. 
lhe system was tested by using a large tank to simulate the blade volume 
and measured leak rates. Air flow rates for cracks grown in flat plates were 
also tested, and recently the air flow through cracks undergoing cyclic loading 
was verified. Recent analysis has also shown that it is improbable for cracks 
to grow simultaneously in both blades at near equal rates to avoid detection by 
differential flow. In field operation the system has been tripped for loose 
cover plates and other induced faults. However, there have not been any cracks 
in the blade to verify the system in actual operation. 
Concern 
The importance of the crack detection system has increased significantly 
with the results of this review that predict rotor weld time to repair esti-
mates as low as 4500 hr. The specific concerns regarding the ability of the 
system to detect a crack are as follows: 
(1) The system may not have the necessary reliability. The system is not 
fa;lsafe, and contains no self testing features except the no-flow tests. The 
low-speed shaft slipring investigation revealed two potential single point 
undetectable failures, for which corrective action is recommended. 
(2) The air compressor may be undersized. The air flow rate for a good 
blade is 4.5 to 8.0 ft 3/min, and the differential flow to initiate a shutdown 
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is 5.0 ft 3/min. Thus, two blades plus the design crack could flow 21 ft 3/min, 
and the compressor is nominally rated at 20 ft3/min. Simultaneous cracks in 
both blades could raise this total flow slightly. 
(3) The criterion of detection of a 12-in crack near station 360 appears 
adequate, but the system may not be sufficiently sensitive to cracks approach-
ing critical lengths out near the blade tip. 
Recommended action 
(1) The design and all operating conditions for the crack detection system 
require a review. 
(2) The crack detection system requires requalification to determine the 
airflow capabilities and failure modes. 
(3) Implementation of appropriate system inspections and/or self testing 
features are needed. 
(4) The crack detection system sensitivity requires reevaluation to 
determine if it is adequate to protect the entire blade. 
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TABLE I - LIST OF CANDIDA1E CRITICAL COMPONENTS 
[C after Hem number lndicates cr1t1cal component.] 
Item No. Component Subassembly 
Structural and mechanical components 
1 Rotor-pitch actuator Rotor assembly 
2 Rotor spindle 
3C Emergency hydraul1c system 
4 Rotor welds 
5 Rotor spars 
0 Rotor blade equipment 
mounting holes 
7C Teeter system 
8C Rotor cap 
9C Nacelle structure and major Nacelle 
bearing supports 
10 low-speed shaft bearings 
11C Yaw drive system 
12 Qu111 shaft Drive traln 
13 Gearbox 
14 H1gh-speed shaft 
15 Generator 
10C Tower, base. and foundatlon Tower assembly 
lJC G1n-po1e system SHe equ1pment 
Electrical components 
18 Vibration effects on generator E1ectr1ca1 power 
protect1on relays system 
19 Substat10n and w1nd turb1ne 
tr1p coordination 
20 Protection adequacy 
21 BPA substat10n 
22 Tower power cable mountings 
23 Low-speed shaft bearing failure Electronic 
detection controls 
24 Overs peed sensing adequacy 
25 Fault memory retention 
20 CRT shutdowns 
27 Yaw sl1pring Sl1pr1ngs 
2B Low-speed shaft sl1pr1ng 
29 Low-speed shaft sl1pr1ng bearing 
TABLE I I 
-
COMPARISON OF RELAY SETTINGS 
Relay device As installed 
Pickup Test 
value value 
Generator winding overtemperature 132°C 
(49 G)a 
Reverse power (32)b 70 kW 5.1 sec at 278 kW 
OHferent1a1 (BJ)c 
Phase A from GEN 0.22 A 
Phase A from BTCU 
1 
Phase B from G£N 
Phase B from BTCU 
Phase C from G£N 
Phase C from BTCU 
Loss of excHat10n (40)d 270· at 44.23 Q 
2"· at 23.0 Q 
Overcurrent (51) BOe h 400 A 
319 0 at 23.0 Q 
0.45 sec at 1000 A 
ov(~~~~;e~;f(~1th restra1nt) 400 A 2.00 sec at 400 A 
Ground fault (64)9 5.9 A 0.05 sec at 23.5 A 
alnduct10n disk type operated by voltage. 
bl nduct10n disk type operated by power (voltage and current). 
cInduction cup type current operated. 
dInduction cup type operated by impedance (voltage and current). 
elnduction disk type operated by current. h 
fInduction disk type operated by current. h 
P1ckup 
value 
132 °C 
70 kW 
0.22 A 
0.20 A 
0.205 A 
0.25 A 
0.195 A 
0.205 A 
400 A 
400 A 
6.1 A 
As found 
Test 
value 
4.80 sec at 278 kW 
270· at 40.93 Q 
215· at 23.0 Q 
324 0 at 23.0 Q 
0.47 sec at 1000 A 
2.52 sec at 400 A 
0.64 sec at 23.5 A 
9Induct1on disk type operated by voltage. 
hThere are three relays of this type~ only one of three relays was checked for cal1brat1on. 
TABLE III. - SUMMARY OF RECOMMENOATIONS FOR CRITICAL COMPONENTS 
---
Item Recommended action 
-------------------------
Prior to attended operation During attended operaUon Prior to unattended operation 
( 3) Emergency (1) Replace system check 
hydraul ic system valves with an acceptable 
type to reduce 1 eakage 
potentia 1 
(2) Revhe Operations and 
Ma; ntenance Manua 1 to 
provide more detai led 
internal leakage check 
and isolation procedures 
(T) Teeter system (1) Retorque bolts attach; ng (1) Establish procedure (1) Design, fabricate, and 
teeter bearing to rotor for and monitor motion install a teeter motion 
bla{le between the following: damper 
(2) Increase torque on (a) Rotor blade and (2) Replace plastic shim 
teeter-stop support horsecollar between horsecollar and 
structure attachment ( b) Low- speed shaft rotor with steel sh~m 
bolts to 80 percent I and teeter stop (3) Determ~ne cause of loss of 
of yield (e) Trunnion and pilot preload 1n thrust bearing 
ring and take corrective action 
(2) Establish procedure 
for and monitor 
elastomeric thrust 
bearing gap 
(3) Oi sassemble WTl 
horsecollar struc-
tUres from rotor 
and inspect 
(4) Provide strain 
measuri ng 
ins t rumenta t i on 
(5) With the manufacturer, 
evaluate the serious-
ness of the surface 
cracks 1n the 
elastomeric bearings 
( 0) Determine cause of weld 
separation between 
horsecollar and radial 
bear1ng retaining ring 
(7) Determine effect of 
parked rotor position 
on teeter moUon 
-- -----~--- r----
(8) Rotor Cap (1) Grind gusset weld (1) Monitor movement (1) Increase bolt size and 
details to improve indicators (eg., preload at low-speed 
weld to a class IIC II denta 1 paste) at shaft-to-rotor cap 
(2) Increase bolt rotor cap-to-low- interface 
torques of rotor cap speed shaft and (2) Install additional gusset 
and low-speed shaft at trunnion-to-teeter plates, as required at 
bolted flange joint interfaces trunnion-to-·rotor cap 
(3) Increase bolt (2) Conduct further i ntersecti on weld 
torques at trunnion analysis and/or ( 3) Repair or redesign pilot 
and teeter bearing experimental eva 1 u- interface 
assembly joint ation of the ( 4) Grind fillet weld wrench 
following: marks and increase washer 
(a) Rotor cap and low- thickness to provide 
speed shaft bolted adequate clearance 
flange to determine 
cyclic stress range 
(b) Trunnion and rotor 
cap intersection 
weld to determine 
stress variation 
around circumference 
(e) Rotor cap cyl inder 
wall stress in 
presence of dri lled 
holes 
(3) Instrument the 
following for strain 
determi naUons: 
(a) Critical gusset 
weld 
~----------------------
TABLE III. - (continued) 
(b) crltical 
circumferential 
location at the 
trunnion and rotor 
cap intersect10n 
weld 
(c) Rotor cap near 
rotor cap and 
low-speed shaft 
bolt flange 
(9) Nacelle struc- (1) Resh1m the downwind (1) Install instrumen-
ture and major bearing bolted joints tation to obtain 
bearing supports to obtain proper stresses at critical 
clampup at the locations in the 
interface, and install downwind bearing 
new bolts, washers, support and primary 
and nuts nacelle truss 
(2) Grind welds on the structure 
secondary verticals 
of the primary 
truss structure 
(11 ) Yaw drive (1) Assess the effect (1) Prevent yaw correc- (1) Rotate the ring gear 90° 
system of impulsive loading tions from taking (2) Align pinion gear to 
on yaw gearbox life place during wind ring gear so as to bring 
(2) Clean and relube turb1ne startup tooth contact and backlash 
pinion and ring and shutdowns within the specifications 
gear teeth of the manufacturer 
(3) Install crossover rel1ef 
valves 
( 4) Make software changes to 
prevent yaw corrections 
during startups and 
shutdowns, and to limit 
the duration of large yaw 
errors 
(5) Experimenta lly determ1 ne 
the effect of dragging 
one or more of the yaw 
park 1 ng brakes duri ng 
yaw correcUons 
(16) Tower, base (1) Vi sua 11 y inspect tower 
and foundation welds every 600 hr for 
cracks 
(2) Retens10n all studs to 
85 000 , 5 000 ft-lb 
(3) Sea 1 tower grout to 
prevent entry of water 
and possible corrosion 
( 4) Repaint base details 
(5) Check preload on rock 
anchors 
(17) Gin pole (1) Add additional weight to 
system the existing gin pole 
proof load to compensate 
for the increase in weight 
from modifications 
including new low-speed 
shaft assembly 
(2) Incorporate formal gin 
pole Operations and 
Maintenance procedures 
which include assembly, 
disassembly. operation, 
proof test loads. main-
tenance, inspection, and 
corrosion prevenUon in 
the Operations and 
Maintenance manual 
(3) Provide envi ronmenta 1 
protection of the gin 
pole winch assembly 
TABLE IV. - SUMMARY OF RECOMMENOAlIONS FOR NONCRIlICAL STRUC1URAL AND MECHANICAL COMPONEN1S 
Item Recommended action 
Prior to attended operation During attended operation Prior to unattended operation During unattended operation 
(1) Rotor pi tch 
actuator3 
(2) Rotor spindle (1) Measure the Belleville (1) Inspect the flange 
spring lengths for attachment bolts for 
conformance to specH- conformance to specH-
icaUon initially and 1cations on type and 
every two months there- torque 
after (2) Replace the plastic shim 
material between highly 
preloaded flange faces 
with steel materials 
(3) Inspect the flange to 
determine 1f inserts 
provide a satisfactory 
long-term repair 
(4) Rotor welds (1) RequalHy the crack (1) IdentHy critical welds 
detecUon system (as in accordance with the 
discussed in appendh guidelines established 
E) to assure 1ts in the subsection Rotor 
re11abllHy Assembly; clearly mark 
critical welds on the 
inside of the blade, and 
perform visual inspec-
tions of these welds at 
an interval to be 
es tab 11 shed by add H i ona 1 
analysis 
(5) Rotor spars a 
10) Rotor blade (1) Show number, size, and 
equi pment location of holes, used 
mounting holes to mount hardware, on the 
drawings 
(10) Low-speed (1) Drain and clean LSS (1) Install improved seals to 
shaft bearings bearing sumps and eliminate leakage 
ref1ll w1th clean oil ( 2) Install a circulating 
forced lubricaUon system 
(12) Qui 11 shaft (1) Torque check the 
quill shaft coupling 
to gearbox bolts 
every 1000 hr of 
operati on 
(13) Gearbox (1) Reshim the gearbox (1) Rework the deta i1 at the 
support feet on WT2 intersection of the 
and WT4 gearbox case and support 
structure to reduce stress 
in the weld 
(14) High-speed (1) Show holes, used to fasten 
shaft balance weights to the 
shaft, on the respective 
drawings 
(15) Generatora 
aNa acUon required. 
TABLE V. _ SUMMARY OF RECOMMENOATIONS FOR NONCRITICAL ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS 
Item Recommended action 
Prior to attended operation During attended operation Prior to unattended operation During unattended operation 
( 18) Vibration 
effects on 
generator 
protection 
relay3 
(19) Substat10n (1) Provide transfer trip 
and wi nd capability between 
turbine trip substation and wind 
coordination turbine 
(20) Protection (1) Install protective (1) Install no-volt trip to 
adequacy cover on 48 V battery the BTCU breaker 
(21) BPA substation (1) Increase inventory of sub-
station equipment spare 
parts 
(2) Install screening beneath 
the recloser to prevent 
entry of rodents 
(22) Tower power (1) Correct cable clamp 
cable mountings plnchlng 
(2) Tighten loose cable 
ladder joints 
(23) low-speed shaft (1) Incorporate LSS bearing 
bearing fal1ure lubrication level sensors 
detection 
(24) Overspeed (1) Perform functional check (1) Incorporate period1c 
sensing of the overspeed sensor functional check in 
adequacy circuH routine maintenance 
(25) Fault memory (1) Add hard copy print 
retention capabllHy to display 
terminals 
(26) CRT shutdowns (1) Add answerback feature 
hardware and software to 
the display term1nals 
(27) Yaw s11prlng (1) Inspect the s' i pr1 ngs for 
contamination and measure 
resistance on the power 
rings 
(2) Inspect and replace the 
molded HV cable 
termination boots as 
required, and install a 
drlp shleld to prevent 
further oil contamination 
(3) Replace the existing 
anti rotation restraint 
wHh an improved des i gn 
which can not load the 
yaw slipr1ng 
(28) Low-speed (1) Implement a self check of 
shaft slipring the crack detection 
system and interchange 
ri ngs 25 and 26 
(29) low-speed 
shaft s11pring 
beari nga 
aNO action required. 
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Figure 22. - Phase conductor (4.16-kV) cable ladder clamps. 
Figure 23. - Power cable ladder extension joints. 
Figure 24. - Wind turbine HV cable suspension at yaw slipring. 
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Figure 26. - Wind turbine control communications link. 
Figure 27. - Wind turbine yaw slipring HV molded cable terminations. 
Figure 28. - Wind turbine yaw slipring anti-rotation restraint. 
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